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SUMMARY
This study provides detailed information on very long term
unemployment (over 2 years) in the European Community. It provides
statistical information on recent trends in very long term unemployment
(VLTU) and the characteristics of the people in VLTU. The study
concentrates on Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
The study also looks at different policies which have been implemented in
the members countries to tackle the problem.
The study concludes that VLTU is a serious problem which is likely to
persist and recommends a concerted policy of increased aggregate demand by
the European Community in conjunction with several policies targeted at the
VLTU. The study also recommends detailed data collection on VLTU
(including a pilot longitudinal study) and a monitoring of the VLTU.
This study was financed by the Commission of the European Communities as
part of its Programme of Research and Actions on the Development of the
Labour Market. The analyses and the results presented do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Commission nor do they commit it to a particular
view of the labour market or on other policy matters.
The report has been made available for information only. It should not be
quoted or referred to in published material without the authority of the
Commission.
Enquiries relating to the study should be addressed to the Directorate
General for Employment and Social Affairs - attention of Division V/B/2 -
Commission of the European Communities - 200, rue de la Loi - 1049 -
Bruxelles.
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Chapter 1 Very Long Term Unemployment in the European Community
P. N. Junankar
1.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been an enormous increase in
unemployment in the EEC and a concomitant increase in long term
unemployment (LTU, duration of one year or more) and very long term
unemployment {VLTU, duration of two years or more). For the European Ten
unemployment increased from about 12 millions in 1983 to about 13 millions in
1986, while VLTU increased (over the same period) from 2 millions to 3
millions (approximately).! This enormous increase in unemployment and VLTU
suggest a crisis in the European labour market which requires concerted
action by the European Community to alleviate the social and economic costs
of unemployment. 2 One of the main problems in preparing this report has
been the paucity of data, on VLTU as well as a virtual absence of any
literature on the subject. Most Government policies that have been
introduced in the Community are aimed at the LTU and the problem of VLTU
is not even noticed.
1 Eurostat/El/506/87
2 See Junankar (1986a,b)
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1.2 Concepts and Measurement Problems
There is no unambiguous definition of unemployment: people who are
employed full-time are clearly not unemployed. Not all of those people who
are not employed would be called unemployed. Obviously, retired people,
housewives looking after children, young people in full-time education are not
unemployed. But some of the housewives may be interested in finding work
but are unable to do so, some of the young people in full-time education may
have preferred to work but in the absence of employment decided to
postpone the evil of unemployment by staying on at school, College,
University etc. There are different methods of collecting data in different
European countries so that comparisons across countries are difficult. The
Labour Force Surveys do provide a similar basis for data collection and are
as yet an unexploited source for further information on unemployment, LTU,
and VLTU. This provides data based on questionnaires: those people who
are not employed, available for, and looking for work are classified as
unemployed.
The problem of measuring LTU and VLTU is even greater. In some
countries, e.g. UK a short spell of illness (3 days or more) removes the
person from an "unemployed state" and on returning to good health is
treated as a newly unemployed person. People who join various Government
schemes (e.g. training schemes) are deemed to be not unemployed, so that if,
on leaving the scheme, they do not find work they are treated as newly
unemployed people. Thus these schemes may lead to interruptions of
unemployment spells which lead to underestimates of VLTU. Information is
therefore necessary on this aspect as well as on recurrent unemployment
spells. Some people over a few years may also suffer unemployment
durations of more than two years, but they are interspersed with short
spells of employment.
Another aspect of unemployment which is relatively poorly documented
are the labour market flows from one labour market state to another. There
is little information available about flows from
(a) unemployment to employment;
(b) unemployment to not-in-the-labour force;
(c) unemployment to Government schemes;
and (d) unemployment to retiring (especially with a
growing number of early retirements).
To reiterate, we need a better data base to analyse the problem of
VLTU. An ideal solution would be for the European Commission to carry out
a pilot study on a longitudinal sample for (at least) a few of the European
Community countries.
However, subject to these limitations let us look at the problem of VLTU
in the EEC. Table 1.1 and Diagrams 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 provide estimates based
on national registered data:
Table 1.1 and Diagrams 1.1-1.3 show very clearly that there has been a
big increase in VLTU and that the problem is more serious for the over 25
year olds. The time-series graphs (diagrams 1.2 and 1.3) show big increases
in VLTU (as a proportion of total unemployment) in Belgium, the Netherlands,
West Germany, Italy and the UK. France has had a much slower increase in
VLTU while Denmark stands out in contrast with a fall in VLTU. These
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diagrams suggest that countries that have had an active policy towards LTU
and VLTU (such as Denmark and France) have succeeded in decreasing
VLTU. (The country report on France, chapter 3, will provide further detail
on this issue. It is important to note that even in a country like West
Germany with an enviable tradition of training and apprenticeships as well as
a more "flexible labour market" (especially compared to the UK) that VLTU
has been increasing. (Perhaps it is worth repeating a cautionary note on
cross country comparisons due to the very difficult methods of measuring
unemployment, and unemployment duration).
Table 1.1 provides information from the Labour Force Surveys, 1985,
which provide comparable data across countries. This suggests that VLTU is
especially serious in Belgium, followed by the Netherlands, UK and then
France. It is interesting to note that women are in a worse situation than
men in Belgium and France, while in the Netherlands and UK men are in a
worse situation than women. In all these countries, the problem of VLTU is
especially acute for older people. Our country studies will provide further
information on this problem.
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Table 1.1 Long-Term Unemployment, European Ten
Long-Term Unemployment (LTU) by Age
(National Registered Data)
Year
Total
Absolute Data (000s)
LTU of which
Over 12 12-24 > 24
Months Months Months
Total
1983 Under
Over
Total
1984 Under
Over
Total
1985 Under
Over
Total
1986 Under
Over
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
Year
Total
1983 Under
Over
Total
1984 Under
Over
Total
1985 Under
Over
Total
1986 Under
Over
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
12196.
4903.
7293.
12833.
5171.
7661.
13037.
5084.
7952.
12916.
4740.
8175.
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
loo. o
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1 100.0
100.0
6
6
2
2
8
5
6
7
9
1
6
4
4338.8
1359.1
2979.6
4940.6
1533.2
3407.6
5160.4
1547.2
3613.1
5144.4
1425.0
3723.2
2268.7
804.8
1462.0
2228.2
822.0
1404.2
2209.9
789.6
1418.1
2138.9
719.2
1415.0
Percentage of Total
LTU
Over 12
Months
35.6
27.7
40.9
38.5
29.6
44.5
39.6
30.4
45.4
39.8
30.1
45.5
of which
12-24
Months
18.6
16.4
20.0
17.4
15.9
18.3
17.0
15.5
17.8
16.6
15.2
17.3
2070.0
554.4
1517.5
2712.5
711.0
2003.5
2950.4
757.7
2194.9
3005.8
705.7
2308.2
> 24
Months
17.0
11.3
20.8
21.1
13.7
26.2
22.6
14.9
27.6
23.3
14.9
28.2
Table 1.1 continued
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Table 1.1 continued
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
Total
Under
Over
Total
Under
Over
Total
Under
Over
Total
Under
Over
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
Percentage
12-24 Months
52.3
59.2
49.1
45.1
53.6
41.2
42.8
51.0
39.3 '
41.6
50.5
38.0
of Total LTU
> 24 Months
47.7
40.8
50.9
54.9
46.4
58.8
57.2
49.0
60.7
58.4
49.5
62.0
Source: Eurostat/El/506/87
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Table 1.2 Very Long Term Unemployment: Distribution by Age and Sex (1985)
Belgium
France
Nether¬
lands
U.K.
All Ages
Persons Male Female
51.2 44.4 55.7
21.3 18.2 24.1
34.8 38.7 29.1
32.5 37.8 24.3
Persons
32.4
13.7
20.1
19.5
Under
Male
26.0
11.0
20.9
23.6
25
Female
36.4
15.0
19.3
13.7
25 and Over 1
Persons
60.6
26.7
42.2
39.9
Male
53.0
23.0
46.3
45.7
Female 1
65.8 !
30.2 1
35.4 1
30.9 I
Notes : Percentages are of all unemployed in age/sex group.
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1985 reproduced in Eurostat/El/506/87.
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Diagram 1.1: Unemployment Duration Distribution in European Ten, October 1986
UNEMPLOYED UNDER 25 YEARS OLD
BY DURATION
3* MONTHS AMD OVER
M.9X
UNEMPLOYED OVER 35 YEARS OLD
BY DURATION
Source: Eurostat/El/506/87
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Diagram 1.2: Long Term Unemployed as a Percentage of Total Unemployed
(National Registered Data)
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Diagram 1.3: Long Term Unemployed as a Percentage of Total Unemployed
(National Registered Data)
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1·3. Causes and Consequences of Very Long Term Unemployment
The causes of the growth of VLTU are to be found in the causes of the
growth of unemployment. The growth of unemployment, after a lag, leads to
a growth in VLTU. With the oil price shocks several countries introduced (to
control inflation) restrictive monetary and fiiscal policies that led to an
increase in unemployment and after some time to VLTU. If we consider the
initial effect is to increase the inflows into unemployment, total unemployment
rises with the proportion of VLTU falling in the first instance. If there is
inadequate aggregate demand, outflows do not increase and the duration of
unemployment increases. One can imagine the unemployed stock to consist of
a queue of workers with the front of the queue consisting of the better
educated and better qualified people while the tail consists of those with less
education and no qualifications. Employers in their hiring policy take on the
better qualified unemployed workers (they outflow from the stock). Each
month a new set of people are made redundant/dismissed or quit to join the
unemployed stock. The better qualified of these move to the front of the
queue (thus pushing back some of the previous members of the stock). This
happens again and again so that the less qualified tend to remain longer in
the queue - there is a process of last-in-first-out for some!
Those people who have been unemployed for some time are treated by
employers as "unemployable" because they have a long duration of
unemployment - "they must be hopeless otherwise they would not have
remained unemployed for so long". The employers treat unemployment
duration as a "signal" of "bad" qualities. The LTU and the VLTU themselves
become demoralised, give up searching for jobs, lose their self respect and
ability to perform well in interviews, some fall ill and as a result are less
likely to find work. It is a vicious circle!
However, the nature of VLTU has now changed. The VLTU are not all
old, infirm, unqualified, etc. Many of them are young or prime age (25-44)
workers, who had held skilled jobs for some time. During the long recession
and change from manufacturing to the service sector, these people are unable
to find work. Employers in the service sector prefer to hire part-time
women workers, they are not unionised and they can be hired and fired
easily without any restrictions from industrial relations legislation.
In the macroeconomics literature the explanation of a continued high level
of unemployment (and hence of high VLTU) is explained in terms of a labour
market consisting of "insiders" and "outsiders". In bargaining over wage
rates unions are postulated to consider the well-being only of the employed
labour force (the "insiders") and ignoring the unemployed (the "outsiders").
Thus when a shock (e.g. the oil price shock) reduces the equilibrium level of
employment, in subsequent wage bargaining wages are determined only by
keeping the existing work force employed. The outsiders (the unemployed)
do not effect wage bargaining. Thus a high level of unemployed caused by a
shock persists and the unemployed become LTU and VLTU - and they do not
affect wages or inflation. This view is argued persuasively by Blanchard and
Summers (1986).
The long term unemployed (whether LTU or VLTU) are not only a wasted
resource (like all the unemployed people) they are also a wasting resource.
The LTU and VLTU lose their skills, they lose motivation, they fall ill: in
crude economic terms human capital is being depreciated. In human terms
there is a mass of misery and suffering: often they live in poverty, they
15
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have lost their self respect and dignity and they accept the verdict of the
labour market with a mixture of resentment and resignation. The social
implications of this are very serious*, some people argue it leads to increased
civil strife, riots, divorce, suicide, illness and death.
16
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1.4 Policy: A Preview
Many new policies have been introduced in the European Community
aimed at the long term unemployed (greater than 12 months) but so far there
has been little awareness of the growing problem of VLTU. There are three
main approaches: firstly, increase aggregate demand to lower overall
unemployment. After a lag, we would expect VLTU to decrease. The second
approach would target policies at the VLTU: the major effect of this would
be to "re-distribute" unemployment. Some of the unemployed people with
shorter durations will now have extended spells of unemployment while those
who are VLTU will (hopefully) leave unemployment. Even these policies can
be targeted at those unemployed people who are already VLTU or at
unemployed people with a set of characteristics (e.g. low education, skills,
etc) who are likely to become VLTU. According to some evidence, (White,
1983) some people have recurring spells of unemployment lapsing into LTU
and VLTU. If this is a general finding then policies should be targeted at
this group before they enter LTU or VLTU. A third major approach for
policy would be to affect the operation of the labour market e.g. by
influencing trade union behaviour, firm behaviour in terms of wage offers,
mobility of labour (via workers or firms), or "labour market flexibility" (to
use a currently fashionable phrase). In the final Chapter we shall look at
policies in more detail. In particular we shall recommend an expansion of
aggregate demand in conjuction with regional employment policy measure
targeted at the VLTU. We shall also recommend policies for firms to change
their hiring and firing policies to help lower VLTU.
II COUNTRY REPORTS
Chapter 2 Very Long Term Unemployment in Belgium
by Daniel Weiserbs
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Chapter 2: Very Long Term Unemployment in Belgium
By Daniel Weiserbs
Université Catholique de Louvain
2.1. Introduction*
Very Long Term Unemployment (VLTU) has hardly received any attention
from the authorities (and this is also reflected in a lack of statistical
studies). The prevailing point of view is that a VLTU person faces a quasi
zero probability of finding a job. Consequently, the only measures (with the
exception of the "Troisième Circuit de Travail" policy) concerning VLTU have
consisted in eliminating this type of unemployed person from official statistics
of labour demand. Thus, in examining the tables below, one should keep in
mind that
(i) since April 1985, VLTU of 55 years or more (50 years in the case of
A.R.) are excluded from unemployment figures,2
(ii) the various schemes for early retirement hide the real evolution of
unemployment, especially by age groups, and lead to an underestimation of
VLTU growth. The bias is somewhat reduced when only C.C.I, with A.N. is
considered.
The major characteristics of VLTU are:
a continuous increase of VLTU (despite the measures mentioned
above) and, in particular, of the extreme long term unemploy¬
ment (five years or more). However, this trend seems to stop
in 1986;
women and people below 40 are disproportionately affected;
the majority of VLTU have a low level of education;
regional differences exist in terms of level of unemploy¬
ment rates but almost none in terms of structure.
The details are given in tables 2.1-2.8. Table 2.1 is derived from total
unemployment while the others are established on the basis of C.C.I.
2.2. Trends in VLTU
The share of VLTU has continuously increased between 1977 and early
1986 moving from 19% to 49% with a strong acceleration during the sub-period
1982-1985. It is worth mentioning that VLTU increased by 44,000 while at the
same time short or medium term unemployment was reduced by 66,400. The
deterioration is especially marked for the very long term category whose
share moves from 10% to 21% between 1982 and 1986.
1 A list of abbreviations is given at the end of this chapter.
2 This represents 50,510 persons at the end of 1985 and 61587 at the end
of 1986.
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The proportion of VLTU is much higher for women than for men although
the evolution through time is rather similar for both sexes (cf. diagram 2.1)
at the end of 1986, two thirds of VLTU were women. Moreover, among the
unemployed, one woman out of four has been jobless for more than 5 years
(one out of seven for men).
Unemployment of the young is particularly worrying: at the end of 1986,
29.3% of the unemployed are below 25 years and 77.5% are below 40. The
average age of a VLTU person is obviously higher than that of short or
medium term; nevertheless people below 40 are clearly in the majority in
both categories: 72% of VLTU are below 40 (16% are below 25). Especially
striking is the increase in very long term unemployment for the group below
40 years: their number has been multiplied by 2.3 between 1982 and 1986.
The National Office of Employment distinguishes C.C.I, according to
whether they were working or not before being registered as unemployed (one
may be entitled to unemployment benefits after education provided that he is
less than thirty). The large majority, 87.6% in 1986, belong to the first of
these two cases. The latter percentage goes to 92% when only VLTU is
considered. This can be explained by institutional factors and is only related
to a major structural component of VLTU, namely thelow level of
qualifications. Indeed, very few of those having finishedat least secondary
school are VLTU persons.
The regional rates of unemployment show structural differences.*
However the share of VLTU and its rate of growth is not very different
between the three regions. However, in contrast to Flanders and Brussels
the share of VLTU increased in 1986.
Diagram 2. 1 Long-term Unemployment, (shares)
60
50
40
30
20-
10-
o· nan
-*- woman
total
T-l 	 J I I	 ' I I I '
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
In 1985 16.2% in Flanders, 22.3% in Walloonia and 21.2% for Brussels
(percentages in terme of "population active assurée")
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Abbreviations
VLTU very long term unemployment (2 years or more)
C.C.I. (chômeurs complets indemnises) fully unemployed person
entitled to unemployment benefits
A.N. (aptitude normale) fully employable person (in terms of
physical capacity)
A.R. (aptitude réduite) person with reduced working capacity.
List of Tables
2.1. Major characteristics of the Very Long Term Unemployed (annual average)
2.2. C.C.I. - Duration of unemployment & working capacity
2.3. C.C.I, with A.N. - Duration and sex (Dec. 31st)
2.4. C.C.I, with A.N. - Duration and age (yearly average)
2.5. C.C.I, with A.N. - Duration and age (Dec. 31st)
2.6. C.C.I, with A.N. - Duration and basis of admission (Dec. 31st)
2.7. Job search spell
2.8. C.C.I, with A.N. - Duration and region (Dec. 31st).
(The Tables marked with an "a" give data in thousands with the "b"
Tables present the data as percentages).
Sources
Eurostat, "Enquete annuelle sur les forces de travail" (table 7)
Office Nationale de l'Emploi (tables 1-6 & 9).
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Table 2.1 Major Characteristics of Very Long-Term Unemployment
1976 1981 1986
Share of very long-term unemployment
in total unemployment 21.7 35.0 51.6
Share
Share
Share
in total
Male:
Female:
in total
very long-term unemployment:
Flanders
Walloonia
Brussels
Total
Flanders
Walloonia
Brussels
Total
of very long-term unemployment:
< 20 years
20 -
25 -
30 -
35 -
40 -
45 -
50 -
55 -
60 -
Total
in total
25 years
30 years
35 years
40 years
45 years
50 years
55 years
60 years
65 years
very long-term unemployment:
Primary school
Secondary school (first three years)
Secondary school (completed)
Higher education
Training
Other
Total
education
22.2
17.0
3.2
42.4
23.4
29.1
5.1
57.6
0.5
7.8
10.1
6.4
6.4
8.2
11.6
15.1
15.3
18.6
100.0
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
100.0
12.4
9.5
4.0
25.9
42.2
26.0
5.9
74.1
0.7
13.4
18.9
15.2
8.9
8.3
9.9
12.1
9.6
3.0
100.0
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
100.0
14.5
14.9
6.2
35.6
36.0
no o
6.1
64.4
0.5
15.1
21.8
18.2
14.0
9.9
10.4
1.7
3.6
1.8
100.0
56.3
24.6
11.1
3.1
1.9
3.0
100.0
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Table 2.2a C.C.I: Duration and Working Capacity (December 31st)
Years Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
10- 20 years
£ 20 years
Total
1982
435.7
A.N.
1984
455.4
1985
413.2
1986
187.7
91.2
112.4
43.2
1.1
0.0
150.4
87.6
151.3
62.3
3.7
0.0
139.9
72.6
126.4
68.4
5.9
0.0
144.8
70.5
111.6
76.6
9.8
0.0
413.3
A.R.
Years Duration 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
10- 20 years
> 20 years
7.2
6.1
14.9
14.8
5.2
0.6
6.5
5.1
15.2
16.4
6.9
0.6
5.5
4.7
9.7
10.3
4.0
0.2
5.0
4.5
8.9
9.7
4.1
0.2
Total 48.3 50.1 34.4 32.1
Total
Years Duration 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
10- 20 years
> 20 years
194.9
97.3
127.3
58.1
6.4
0.6
156.9
92.8
166.5
78.7
10.6
0.6
145.4
77.3
136.2
78.7
10.1
0.3
149.8
75.0
120.4
86.3
13.9
0.2
Total 484.0 505.5 447.6 445.4
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Table 2.2b C.C. I.: Duration and Working Capacity (December 31st)
Years Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
£ 10 years
Total
1982
100.00
A.N.
1984 1985
100.00 100.00
1986
43.08
20.93
25.80
9.92
0.25
33.03
19.24
33.22
13.68
0.81
33.86
17.57
30.59
16.55
1.43
35.04
17.06
27.00
18.53
2.37
100.00
A.R.
Years Duration 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
i 10 year's
14.91
12.63
30.85
30.64
10.77
12.97
10.18
30.34
32.73
13.77
15.99
13.66
28.20
29.94
11.63
15.58
14.02
27.73
30.22
12.77
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total
Years Duration 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5 - 10 years
2: 10 years
40.27
20.10
26.30
12.00
1.32
31.04
18.36
32.94
15.57
2.10
32.48
17.27
30.43
17.58
2.26
33.63
16.84
27.03
19.38
3.12
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 2.3a C.C.I and A.N.: Duration and Sex (December 31st)
Men
Duration 1982 1984 1985 1986
86/569
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
> 10 years
104.5
47.7
38.1
7.7
0.2
78.6
42.5
68.1
14.7
0.8
70.1
32.1
51.7
17.1
1.1
71.7
30.2
42.9
22.6
1.6
Total 198.2 204.7 172.2 168.9
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
> 10 years
Total
1982
237.5
Women
1984
250.7
1985
241.1
1986
83.2
43.5
74.3
35.5
0.9
71.8
45.1
83.2
47.6
3.0
69.7
40.5
74.7
51.3
4.8
73.0
40.3
68.7
54.0
8.3
244.4
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
£ 10 years
1982
Total
1984 1985 1986
187.7
91.2
112.4
43.2
1.2
150.4
87.6
151.3
62.3
3.8
139.9
72.6
126.4
68.4
6.0
144.8
70.5
111.6
76.6
9.8
Total 435.7 455.4 413.2 413.3
Table 2.3b C.C.I and A.N. Duration and Sex (December 31st)
Men
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
¿10 years
1982
52.72
24.07
19.22
3.88
0.10
1984
38.40
20.76
33.27
7.18
0.39
1985
40.71
18.64
30.02
9.93
0.64
1986
42.45
17.88
25.40
13.38
0.95
86/569
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Women
Duration 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 1 year
- 2
- 5
years
years
5-10 years
£ 10 years
35.03
18.32
31.28
14.95
0.38
28.64
17.99
33.19
18.99
1.20
28.91
16.80
30.98
21.28
1.991
29.87
16.49
28.11
22.09
3.40
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
£ 10 years
1982
43.08
20.93
25.80
9.92
0.28
1984
33.03
19.24
33.22
13.68
0.83
1985
33.86
17.57
30.59
16.55
1.45
1986
35.04
17.06
27.00
18.53
2.37
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Table 2.4a C.C.I, with A.N. Duration and Sex (yearly average)
Year Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
1977 55.118 65.124 12.297 34.882 7.009 32.370 74.424 132.376
1978 60.949 63.338 13.655 34.017 10.347 50.363 84.951 147.718
1979 57.158 64.939 14.849 32.158 13.657 64.594 85.664 161.691
1980 66.975 71.111 13.593 32.379 16.279 75.016 96.847 178.506
1981 97.110 79.234 24.823 39.076 20.283 84.273 142.216 202.583
1982 101.624 81.832 45.026 46.101 34.171 100.308 180.821 228.241
1983 101.364 83.879 47.681 46.975 58.341 117.580 207.386 248.434
1984 85.721 78.275 46.150 47.112 75.983 129.399 207.854 254.786
1985 75.364 72.611 36.623 43.529 75.774 133.430 187.761 249.570
1986 68.392 69.544 30.801 40.661 68.184 131.988 167.377 242. 193
Table 2.4b C.C.I, with A.N.: Duration and Sex (yearly average)
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Male
26.65
26.20
23.11
24.32
28.16
24.84
22.24
18.53
17.23
16.70
Female
31.49
27.22
26.25
25.83
22.98
20.00
18.40
16.92
16.60
16.98
Male
5.95
5.87
6.00
4.94
7.20
11.01
10.46
9.98
8.37
7.52
Female
16.87
14.62
13.00
11.76
11.33
11.27
10.31
10.18
9.95
9.93
Male
3.39
4.45
5.52
5.91
5.88
8.35
12.80
16.42
17.33
16.65
Female
15.65
21.65
26.11
27.24
24.44
24.52
25.80
27.97
30.51
32.23
Male
35.99
36.51
34.63
35.17
41.25
44.20
45.50
44.93
42.93
40.87
Female
64.01
63.49
65 . 37
64.83
58.75
55.80
54.50
55.07
57.07
59.13
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Table 2.5a C.C.I, and A.N.: Duration and Age (December 31st)
Age
Age
Total
1982
Less than 1 year
1984 1985 1986
Less than
25-39
40-54
> 55
Total
25 87.5
68.0
26.7
5.5
187.7
69.2
55.8
20.8
4.7
150.4
1 -
63.0
53.7
19.2
3.9
139.9
- 2 Years
63.9
58.0
19.2
3.7
144.8
1982 1984 1985
91.2 87.6 72.6
1986
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
31.9
37.1
17.4
4.7
31.3
35.1
16.2
5.0
27.1
29.6
12.2 -
3.7
25.8
29.4
11.9
3.4
70.5
Age
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
1982
29.6
51.9
23.4
7.5
2 -
1984
34.4
70.1
33.6
13.1
- 5 Years
1985
29.7
64.8
26.7
5.2
1986
26.8
57.0
23.3
4.5
Total 112.4 151.3 126.4 111.6
Age
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
1982
2.3
23.7
13.8
4.5
> ;
1984
3.2
34.3
19.2
9.3
5 Years
1985
4.9
46.5
19.1
3.9
1986
4.6
54.9
23.3
3.6
Total 44.4
Table 2.5a continued
66.1 74.3 86.5
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Table 2.5a continued
Total
Age 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 25 151.4 138.1 124.7 121.2
25-39 180.8 195.3 194.6 199.3
40-54 81.3 89.9 77.2 77.6
> 55 22.3 32.2 16.7 5.3
Total 435.7 455.4 413.2 413.3
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Table 2.5b C.C.I and A.N.: Duration and Age (December 31st)
Age 1982
Less than 1 Year
1984 1985 1986
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
46.6
36.2
14.2
2.9
46.0
37.10
13.8
3.1
45.0
38.4
13.7
2.8
44.1
40.1
13.3
2.6
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Age
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
Total
1982
35.0
40.7
19.1
5.2
1
1984 .
35.7
40.1
18.5
5.7
- 2 Years
1985
37.3
40.8
16.8
5.1
1986
36.6
41.7
16.9
4.8
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Age
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
Total
1982
26.3
46.2
20.8
6.7
2 -
1984
22.7
46.3
22.2
8.7
- 5 Years
1985
23.5
51.3
21.1
4.1
1986
24.0
51.1
20.9
4.0
100.00 100.00 100.0 100.00
Age
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
1982
5.2
53.4
31.1
10.1
£ 5 Years
1984
4.8
51.9
29.1
14.1
1985
6.6
62.6
25.7
5.25
1986
5.3
63.5
26.9
4.2
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 2.5b continued
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Table 2.5b continued
Total
Age 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 25
25-39
40-54
> 55
34.8
41.5
18.7
5.1
30.3
42.9
19.7
7.1
30.2
47.1
18.7
4.0
29.3
48.2
18.8
3.7
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
86/569
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Table 2.6a C.C.I
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
£ 2 years
. wit h A.N.: 1
1982
165.7
85.8
147.6
Juration ar
Work
1984
126.4
76.8
205.9
id Basis o
1985
116.2
61.5
187.4
f Admission (De
1986
121.3
58.5
182.2
cember 31st)
Total 399.1 409.2 365.1 362.0
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
£ 2 years
982
22.0
5.4
9.2
Education
1984
24.0
10.8
11.4
1985
23.7
11.1
13.3
1986
23.5
12.0
15.8
Total 36.6 46.2 48.1 51.3
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
£ 2 years
1982
187.7
91.2
156.8
Total
1984
150.4
87.6
217.4
1985
139.9
72.6
200.8
1986
144.8
70.5
198.0
Total 435.7 455.4 413.2 413.3
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Table 2.6b C.C.I, with A.N.: Duration and Basis of Admission (December 31st
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
ì 2 years
Total
1982
41.52
21.50
36.98
100.00
Work
1984
30.89
18.77
50.32
100.00
1985
31.83
16.84
51.33
100.00
1986
33.51
16.16
50.33
100.00
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
> 2 years
1982
60.11
14.75
25.14
Education
1984
51.95
23.38
24.68
1985
49.27
23.08
27.65
1986
45.81
23.39
30.80
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
> 2 years
1982
43.08
20.93
35.99
Total
1984
33.03
19.24
47.74
1985
33.86
17.57
48.60
1986
35.04
17.06
47.91
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Table 2.7a Job Search Spell
After Job
Loss
1 1983 1984
Months I
Less than 6 I 39 43
6-11 I 41 37
£ 12 1183 201
Total 1 263 281
First Job
1983 1984
After
Inactivity
1983 1984
86/569
Total
1983 1984
17
24
39
80
20
22
48
90
14
16
70
100
11
14
65
90
71
80
292(Ό
445
74
73
314(2)
463
(*) 2 years or more for 191
(2) 2 years or more for 211
Table 2.7b Job Search Spell
Months
Less than 6
6-11
> 12
Total
After Job
Loss
1983 1984
14
15
69
100
83
59
58
00
15.30
13.17
71.53
100.00
First Job
1983 1984
21
30
48
100
25
00
75
00
22
24
53
100
.22
44
.33
.00
After
Inactivity
1983 1984
14
16
70
100
00
00
00
00
12
15
72
100
22
56
22
00
Total
1983 1984
15
17
65
100
96
98
15
15
62(1)67
00 100
98
77
82(2)
00
(*·) 2 years or more for 65% of them
(2) 2 years or more for 67% of them
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Table 2.8a C.C.I, and A.N.: Duration and Region (December 31st)
86/569
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
£ 2 years
Total
Flanders Wallonia
1982 1984 1985 1986 1982 1984 1985 1986
109.2
51.5
84.9
82.2
46.8
118.8
73.9
36.2
103.1
77.3
34.5
98.8
59.6
28.5
52.8
52.7
30.8
73.0
50.5
27.6
72.0
52.5
28.4
76.3
245.6 247.8 213.1 210.5 140.9 156.5 150 0 157.2
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
i 2 years
Total
1982
19.0
11.2
19.1
Brussels
1984 1985
15.5
10.1
25.6
15.5
8.8
25.8
1986
15.1
7.6
22.9
Belgium
1982 1984 1985 1986
187.7
91.2
156.8
150.4
87.6
217.4
139.9
72.6
200.8
144.6
70.5
198.0
49.2 51.2 50.1 45.6 435.7 455.4 413.2 413.3
Table 2.8b C.C.I, and A.N.: Duration and Region (December 31st)
Duration
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
> 2 years
Total
Flanders Wallonia
1982 1984 1985 1986 1982 1984 1985 1986
44.46 33.17 34.68 36.72
20.97 18.89 16.99 16.39
34.57 47.94 48.38 46.94
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
42.30
20.23
37.47
33.67
19.68
46.65
33.67
18.40
48.00
33.40
18.07
48.54
Duration
Brussels Belgium
1982 1984 1985 1986 1982 1984 1985 1986
Less than 1 year 38.62 30.27 30.94 33.11 43.08 38.03 33.86 35.04
1-2 years 22.76 19.73 17.56 16.67 20.93 19.24 17.57 17.06
£ 2 years .38.82 50.00 51.50 50.22 85.99 47.74 48.60 47.91
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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2.3. Employment Policies in Belgium since 1973
2.3.1. Introduction
Belgium being a small open economy suffered particularly from the
recession following the first oil price shock of 1973 and resulted in a massive
destruction of employment. There was a widespread belief in the country
that only a co-ordinated international economic policy could alleviate these
difficulties, preferably through a fine tuned and well co-ordinated Keynesian
policy conducted at the level of the European Community, or even at the
O.E.C.D. level. Hence, the strong conviction that national policies were
powerless in terms of employment has been shared in most economic and
social circles in Belgium and explains why it has been politically possible to
focus national economic policy on such issues as inflation, balance of
payments, and public finance, and not directly on employment which was
expected to benefit from these actions.
Therefore, the most efficient way to give an account of the employment,
policies in Belgium is to start with a brief analysis of the main phases of the
macroeconomic policies and their consequenes ön the labour market, and thon
to detail the specific measures directly aimed at the creation of jobs or th."
curbing of unemployment.
2.3.2 Macroeconomic policy and its Impact on Employment
Economic policy changed direction in 1981-1982 and it is operational '·.<<
describe separately the 1974-1981 and the 1981-1986 periods. Table 2.9
presents some useful figures which will be used in this section.
(i) Period 1974-1981
. Stabilisation policy and demand regulation by the volume of public
expenditure remained the main ingredients of a macroeconomic policy
inherited from the high growth sixties.
This implied:
(a) massive recruitment in the public sector;
(b) support of household incomes through
high growth of the real wage,
extension of the volume of social prestations (increase in the
number of beneficiaries and revaluation in real terms of the unit
allocations), and
generalised indexation of wages and social transfers;
(c) subsidisation of declining enterprises aimed at limiting the
social consequences of a deindustrialisation process more than
at restructuring the productive capacity.
These actions sustained demand and incomes and maintained a minimum
level of activity and employment. They would have been the correct answer
to compensate a temporary decline in growth until an expected recovery of
international activity. However, one should emphasise that, to a large extent,
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the support of domestic demand results from mechanisms introduced in the
early sixties rather than from a voluntary policy.
Table 2.9 Selection of Macroeconomic Indicators
1974-1981 1981-1986
Macroeconomic objectives
Growth of GNP (1)
Inflation rate (1)
Unemployment in % of active population (2)
Current balance in % of GNP (2)
Public sector deficit in %of GNP (2)
Labour market indicators (3)
Active population
Total domestic employment
Employment in the private sector
Employment in the state sector (including
unemployment absorption schemes)
Border workers (net inflow)
Unemployment
Economic policy indicators
Real wage costs (1)
Labour productivity (1)
Social security transfers in % of GNP (2)
Social security contribution in % of GNP (2)
Direct personal taxes in % of GNP (2)
Households' real disposable income (1)
1.6
6.9
10.0
-4.7
14.4
1.4
5.7
12.6
1.8
-10.2
+187
-118
-228
+110
- 16
+321
+82
-37
-61
+23
_ η
+121
3.1
2.5
20.4
12.9
15.7
2.6
-1.0
1.9
19.2
14.4
15.5
-0.2
Notes
(1) Average annual growth rate
(2) At the end of the period
(3) Variation in thousands during the period
(ii) Period 1981-1987
Policy makers became progressively conscious that slow growth was not a
short-term disturbance and that it was necessary to stop the destruction of
the productive capacity and of employment through a restoration of the
fundamental macroeconomic disequilibria.
In 1981 the first changes in the orientation of the economic policy became
perceptible through two significant measures aimed at the recovery of the
competitiveness and the profitability of the enterprises, especially in the
open sector:
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The "interprofessional" agreement of 1981 through which the
Government "persuaded" the social partners to agree on a
limitation of the growth of real wages which would however
remain fully indexed.
The "Maribel operation" of 1981: a reduction of the employers
social security contributions on blue collar workers (to
stimulate exports and construction sectors) compensated by
an increase of the V.A.T. (hitting mostly imported products).
Initially the operation amounted to a reduction of social
security contributions equivalent to 1% of the GNP, it was
halved after one year and transformed into a lump sum reduction;
the compensatory rise in VAT has not been revised.
In 1982 a new governmental coalition, granted with "special powers" by
the Parliament, initiated a new economic policy which is still in force
today.
The 1982 package, and its later follow-up, had four principal targets:
(a) Control the development of the wage- costs by the quasi-
suppression of real wage growth; this measure has been enforced
from February 1982 to December 1986.
(b) Creation of a "competitivity norm" allowing the Government to
prevent wage indexation if unit labour costs in Belgium grew
faster than the average of the seven main trading partners; it
has in fact not been necessary to apply this clause because
the other actions were sufficient to prevent drifts of the
labour costs.
(c) Reduce public expenditure both to decrease public deficit and
limit imports through a controlling of household incomes.
Offset the deflationary effect of the preceding measures and
increase, in national currency, the price of foreign relative
to domestic production. After 40 years of stability the Belgian
Belgian franc was devalued by 8.5% in February 1982. Incomes
policy measures were implemented to prevent the repercussion of a
rise in import prices onto the wages and incomes, by, in
particular, temporary suspension of wages indexation.
(d) Encourage through fiscal incentives the capitalisation of the
corporate debts to restore companies profitability and induce
self-financed investments.
This course of action proved rapidly efficient in terms of current balance
but could not prevent a further decline of the construction sector which had
nearly collapsed in 1981 as a consequence of the reduction of public
investments, the low growth of real disposable income, the abandonment by
the public sector of the social housing programmes, and the rising real
interest rates. However, it could not significantly reduce the public sector
deficit created by the "snowball effect" of the burden of the debt.
The 1982 package was completed by a time varying modulation in the VAT
rate on residential investments and specific measures in favour of the
construction sector, and by two additional packages aimed at the public
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finances in 1984 and 1986.
These last governmental plans, imposed by the public finance constraints
have a deflationary content with adverse effect on the employment front:
Systematic increase of the parafiscality: increase in 1983 of
the employers' contributions' average rate (by suppression of
"ceilings"); "index jumps" transferring three times to the State
the product of the first indexation (2% of the gross wage) of the
year. The index jumps of 1984 and 1985 have been levied, the third
one will be taken as soon as the consumer prices will have increased by
2% with respect to the last jump. This will probably happen in 1988.
Contraction of the household's disposable income.
Reduction of all categories of public expenditure, with the
exception of the crisis-led expenses: unemployment and public
debt service.
(iii) Assessment
As already pointed out this description of the economic policies reveals
that the financial equilibria were the primary concern, not employment. This
policy has been relatively efficient but it is likely that the same
macroeconomic results could have been achieved with less adverse effects on
employment, by using another policy mix to reduce the public finances deficit
without changing the global target. It is also striking to note that economic
policy has not been consistent with regard to employment: in particular
measures increasing the wage cost have been coexisting with actions trying
to reduce it. Similarly the huge incease in the wage wedge implied by the
"index jumps" seems out of line with the current political discourse on
flexibility and supply side effects.
2.4. Specific Employment Policies
As mentioned earlier, specific employment policies have often originated
from the negative effects of macroeconomic measures taken with the aim of
reducing external and public deficits. Indeed, several schemes described
below have been introduced simultaneously with deflationary governmental
decisions in order to limit their impact.
Broadly speaking, employment policies may be divided into three
categories according to whether their main objective was (i) to act on the
labour supply including cosmetic measures improving unemployment
statistics; (ii) to act on labour demand either of the private or of the
public sector; (iii) to affect the labour market organisation through various
forms of work sharing.
(i) Control of the Labour Supply
The relative failure of macroeconomic and sectoral policies have driven
the Government to adopt several easy, although somewhat unattractive,
measures to reduce unemployment by adjusting the labour supply.
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a. Retarding entry to the labour force
Lengthening of military service and of mandatory education (up to 18
years of age) have been imposed. Unfortunately this latter measure had no
noticable effect upon the level of qualifications of the very few people
concerned.
b. Restricting entry into the labour force
Immigration has been drastically reduced and various rules and controls
for the entitlement to unemployment benefits have been introduced.
c. Reduction of the labour force by early retirement
Three forms of early retirement coexist. The first one, known as
"prepension conventioneile", largely converts definite lay-offs into retirement
rather than unemployment. A second one, the "prepension de retraite"
consists in replacing an older worker by a young one. The third one,
introduced in April 1985, is merely a change in reporting procedure which
transforms elderly long-term unemployed (50 years old or more) into "young
pensioners" (representing 65,635 persons in April 1987). Altogether, early
retirement schemes have reduced the unemployment figure of June 30, 1985)
by about 180,000.
The system of "prepension de retraite" merits some comment. In
principle, it should result in redistributing work among generations at low
cost, i.e. the difference between revenue of the pension and unemployment
compensation. In reality, however, only 70% of workers retired under this
system have effectively been replaced. Moreover, internal promotion schemes
make it very difficult to decrease the overall wage bill while productivity
gains are uncertain. As a result, the average budgetary cost of replacing
older workers by younger ones turned out to be higher than creating a new
job under the TCT (see below) and this ignoring the fact that medical care
costs are significantly higher for retired people than for workers of the same
age.
(ii) Job creation in Non-Market Activities
Starting in 1977, the Government has taken several direct measures
to reduce employment by providing jobs to eligible unemployed through
various temporary schemes all assumed not to crowd out private production.
a. Jobless employed by the public authorities (Chômeurs mis
au travail")
This is the oldest system. It consists in allowing, under certain
conditions, the employment of registered unemployed persons by a public
authority for a limited (but renewable) period of time. The cost is only
slightly higher than the unemployment allowance and it is nearly totally
covered by a subsidy from the Ministry of Employment to the recruiting
public authority. Until 1976 the system was mostly applied by local
authorities, especially in rural areas. In the end of the seventies it was
extended and culminated in 1985, occupying 31,031 persons in June of that
year. The present tendency is a reduction because the central Government
has decided a diminution of the share of the cost it financed. The system is
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controversial as in practice it often permits the fulfilment of civil servants
tasks by low paid workers without job security.
b. The "Cadre Special Temporaire" (CST) and "Troisième Circuit de
Travail" (TCT)
These programmes, occupying respectively 16,583 and 25,748 persons in
June 1985, consist in creating temporary jobs outside of the private sector in
"socially useful activities" which would not have been realised otherwise.
Their main difference is that the T.C.T. is oriented to long-term blue-collar
unemployed. Their relatively limited success may be explained by:
employers participation in the cost of the CST programme starting
in the second year;
the administration's difficulty to find socially useful projects
that did not crowd-out private production;
the lack of motivation for accepting a temporary job and the
constraints imposed by the TCT.
In practical terms, young workers move quite often from a mandatory
training in a firm to some employment under the CST or TCT, experiencing
successively periods of unemployment, and finding themselves at the age «..if
30 discouraged and without real professional experience. On the other haru.1
the net average budgetary cost of those schemes is quite low (around BF
135,000 per year).
Table 2.10 details the evolution and the composition of public employment
during the periods 1974-1981 already referred to in the first section. This
table shows clearly that since 1981 the unemployment absorption schemes
constitute the only source of growth of employment in the public sector.
Their real effect was more to hold public employment constant at a lower cost.
than to reduce unemployment.
Table 2.10: Employment in the public sector (variation in thousands)
I
I Administration
(Education
I Defense
I Jobless employed in the public sector
I Other absorption schemes
I Total
I 	
1974-1981
+ 24
+ 33
+ 3
+ 27
+ 23
+110
1 1981-1986
1 + 3
1 - 3
1 - 3
1 + 1
1 + 26
I + 24
(iii) Job Creation in the private sector
Since 1983, firms with at least 50 employees have been required to
absorb (up to 3% of the firm's enrolment) a few of the young people entering
the labour market - and eligible for unemployment benefit - through
mandatory training of 6 months ("stage des jeunes"). Several measures have
been taken in order to raise labour demand on a more permanent basis. One
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may distinguish here various types of marginal wage subsidy and incentives
to unemployed to develop their own businesses. It is clearly impossible to
isolate the respective impact of each measure. Nevertheless those which seem
to have at least received an audience in the public are:
exemption during two years of contributions to social security
for self-employed people hiring one unemployed person ("plan
plus un");
reduction of employer's contributions to social security in the
case of recruitment in 1987 of additional workers on the condition
that they are fully unemployed for at least two years or belong to
the category of "young unemployed" who have not yet found a job;
soft loan (15 years at 4% or 10 years at 5%) of 500,000BF to
unemployed people creating their own business with no reimbursement
in case of "bona fide" failure before the seventh year.
The net impact of these measures is difficult to assess it seems that the
first one has permitted the creation of approximately 20,000 jobs at an
extremely low cost for the state. The second measure is important because it
is oriented towards certain categories of workers who are more or less
excluded from the labour market because their level of qualification is not
sufficient to make them recruitable at the minimum legal wage rate. The
drawback of the system is that it must be temporary to remain a subsidy to
marginal employment. It has been noted that many companies recruit young
workers on the express condition that they register as unemployed for the
minimum period to be taken into consideration for the subsidy.
(iv) Work sharing experiments
The idea of organising work sharing through a reduction of working
hours has been widely discussed in Belgium and various experiments have
been attempted. However, at the aggregate level one notes that, somewhat
surprisingly, the tendential reduction of conventional working hours has been
slower since 1975 than earlier (annual rate of growth 1960-1975: -1.2%,
1975-1985: -0.6%). It seems that organisational problems linked with the
reduction of working hours are such that enterprises regard this policy as a
cause of increasing rigidities notwithstanding the fact that they have been
granted incentives to reduce working time (e.g. 5-3-3). Therefore work
sharing has been introduced very cautiously and under two main forms:
a. Extension of part-time employment
Until recently part-time employment was less developed in Belgium than
in other European countries, mainly because of strong opposition of the
trade-unions.
After 1981 the legislation was progressively modified so that presently
there is no more para-fiscal discrimination against part-time employment.
Statistics on the subject are very poor but a recent study by R. Toilet
reveals that part-time employment amounted to 4% of total employment in 1974
and to 8% in 1985. There is some evidence that since 1981 most newly
created jobs were part-time jobs. For instance since 1986 all new civil
servants are recruited on the basis of 4/5 of a full-time occupation during
their first year of service. On average, in the private sector, part-time
26
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workers are employed half-time.
b. The 5-3-3 programme
At the end of 1983, under governmental pressure, the social partners
signed a collective agreement (legally enforced as is common practice in
Belgium) through which enterprises (in specific sectors) would reduce by 5%
the working time and recruit 3% additional workers or, in the case of
enterprises which could justify a "state of economic difficulty", maintain in
place workers they would normally dismiss. Hourly wages were maintained
constant. The system was justified on the grounds that it would compensate
the loss of income incurred by the wage earners as a consequence of the
accompanying measures of the 1982 devaluation by an increse in employment
instead of wages. This loss was estimated at 3%, hence the last 3 of 5.3.3.
In case of non-compliance with the agreement the enterprise would have to
pay a fee amounting to a fraction of the wage bill equal to the missing
recruitment, i.e. maximum 3%.
It is extremely difficult to give an account of the results of this
programme because the legislation is extremely complicated, especially as far
as the verification of the net increase in employment is concerned due to the
loose concept of enterprises and sectors in difficulty. A report of the
National Labour Council evaluates a net increase of 7,500 jobs as a result of
the programme (excluding the building sector where net losses were
registered). In practice it seems that the main result was a stabilisation of
employment in many sectors where otherwise it would probably have further
declined.
2.4. Conclusions
The unemployment problem in Belgium has been tackled without any
economic or ideological rationale. Pragmatism has been the rule and a
considerable effort of imagination has been carried on to find solutions to
specific problems within the framework of a constraining political and
economic environment. One can regroup and try to assess these policies
under three headings: creation of productive jobs, unemployment absorption
schemes and various forms of work sharing.
The creation of productive jobs, certainly the most promising way to
reduce unemployment, is the objective of both the macroeconomic policy and
the specific policies of subsidisation of investment and employment. The
macroeconomic policy has been correctly directed towards the restoration of
financial equilibria, but the same target could have been reached with more
positive effects on employment. For instance numerous studies conducted in
the Planning Bureau and universities have shown that investment subsidies
and reduction of corporate taxes could have been advantageously replaced by
marginal employment subsidies or reductions of employers' contributions to
social security. Efforts in this direction have been relatively few but
promising; the replacement of investment subsidies by marginal employment
subsidies could prove interesting in terms of employment without cost for the
public finances. It remains nevertheless that the eradication of
unemployment through the creation of productive jobs will need long lasting
efforts and that other solutions must be found.
The unemployment absorption schemes have proved quantitatively
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efficient and they constitute an efficient method at a relatively low cost.
They have several drawbacks:
they result in creating employment with precarious status,
without necessarily increasing flexibility;
they have not always been oriented towards the production
of public goods;
they tend to reproduce the inequalities of the labour market,
i.e. the proportion of women and handicapped people which is high
in unemployment figures is low in the absorption schemes;
they are a disincentive for a necessary adaptation of the
education sector by providing a quasi-automatic issue to
several otherwise futureless formations;
by recruiting registered unemployed people only these programmes
tend to organise a period of unemployment as a necessary
transition between school and profession, this is worsened
by the fact that marginal employment subsidies are also
restricted to the recruitment of registered unemployed;
it is not clear whether these programmes really absorb unemployed
people, or offer the public and non market sectors the possibility
to recruit at low cost and without permanent status workers they
would need anyway.
The work sharing schemes are probably very promising but it is
extremely difficult to assess their potential efficiency. They imply a
reorganisation of the labour relations the implications and the modalities of
which are not clearly understood.
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3.1 The Growth of Very Long Term Unemployment
1. There are two statistical sources for the estimation of very long term
unemployment (VLTU): data from the ANPE (National Employment Agency) and
from the INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).
Monthly statistics of 'End of Month Job-Seekers' (DEFM) can be
calculated from registrations with the ANPE. Within this total, job-seekers
registered for at least two years can be identified. It should be noted that
DEFM statistics are affected by a number of variables:
(i) changes in the public administration of job placements
(ii) modifications in the benefit system
(iii) employment policy measures
VLTU can be calculated from the annual Employment Survey, carried out
by the INSEE in March. From replies to the Employment Survey, the INSEE
estimates the PSERE (total of unemployed seeking employment), a total similar
to the 'total of unemployment as defined by the BIT' (International Labour
Office). In this case, VLTU can be defined as the number of PSERE who
have been unemployed for at least two years. (The PSERE total has the
advantage of being easily broken down for a more detailed analysis by sex,
age, etc., which is not the case for the BIT-defined figure). The length of
unemployment is established from replies given in the Survey.
Estimates of VLTU, defined as 2 years or more, will vary depending on
whether the criterion used is the period of registration with the ANPE, or
the period of unemployment, or even the period of job-seeking, as shown by
a comparison of ANPE and INSEE statistical data. In either case, however,
VLTU is undeniably showing a marked increase.
2. There is a marked absolute increase in VLTU.
There are at present, according to the March 1986 Employment Survey
(the latest available), 598,851 PSERE unemployed of 2 years or more compared
with 175,946 in March 1980 - an increase by a factor of 3.4.
In the same period, March 1980 - March 1986, the DEFM registered with
the ANPE for two years or more increased by a factor of 2.3, from 121,565 to
281,059. By the beginning of 1987 (latest available figures) this had
increased to nearly 350,000.
Furthermore, the increase in VLTU has been continuous. Detailed
statistics for the period 1980-1987 (see appendix for tables) show no
slackening in the growth of the phenomenon.
3. Again, the relative amount of VLTU has also increased. VLTU, between
1980 and 1987 showed a stronger growth than either unemployment or LTU
(Long Term Unemployment), defined as unemployment of 1 year or more.
VLTU currently represents more than a quarter of the PSERE, and one in
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4. A geographical analysis, conducted over the 22 French regions, shows
variations in the relative size of VLTU, (DEFM of 2 years of more), compared
with total unemployment. The variation is between 9.4 and 16.6%. But in
general, the higher the level of regional unemployment, the higher the level
of VLTU (see graph).
There are, however, three regions (PACA - Provence-Alps-Cote d'Azur;
CO - Corsica; and LR - Languedoc-Rousillon) which have a high rate of
unemployment together with a relatively low level of VLTU. The explanation
is that these three regions share a common feature, namely a highly
developed tertiary sector based on tourism, providing great opportunities for
short term unemployment, which in turn reduces the possibility of VLTU
developing.
5. There is finally one particularly alarming aspect of the growth of VLTU
which needs emphasising. It is that already approximately half the VLTU
have been unemployed for 3 years or more. More precisely, they total over
160,000 using DEFM data (46.4% of the DEFM of 2 years or more) and nearly
325,000 using PSERE data (54.1%)..
3.2 Development of VLTU and Characteristics of the VLTU
6. It is evident from Table 3.2, Analysis by Sex and Age of the VLTU, that
women form the majority of the total. As the total of women in the working
population is less than men, it follows that VLTU affects women relatively
more than men.
Furthermore, the break-down by age shows that the majority fall in the
category of 25 - 49 year olds. Those over 50 represent about 22% (PSERE)
or 35% (DEFM). Finally, those under 25 years old constitute about one 50th
(PSERE) or just over one tenth (DEFM) of VLTU.
PSERE - 2 years
& over
March 1986
March 1984
March 1980
DEFM - 2 years
& over
January 1987
March 1984
March 1980
Men
45.0
37.0
32.6
45.4
48.2
40.3
Women
55.0
63.0
67.3
54.6
51.8
59.7
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Under 25
22.4
28.3
18.9
11.6
12.7
-
25-49
55.1
44.0
42.8
52.6
32.3
-
50 and
over
22.5
27.7
38.3
35.7
55.0
-
Total
100
100
100
100
100
-
Table 3.2 - Analysis by Sex and Age of VLTU (%).
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It is however very important to note that the characteristics of the VLTU
are changing with time. More fundamentally, the breakdown by sex and age
of the VLTU cannot be understood without an analysis of the process by
which it develops.
7. In interpreting this breakdown, the first factor to be considered is the
employability of the different categories of job-seekers, i.e., their chances of
escaping from unemployment. The lowest employability appears to be that of
the over 50's, while the highest is that of the under 25's, while those aged
25-49 fall between the two. This remains true, whichever indicator is used.
More precisely:
43.8% of PSERE unemployed over 50 have been unemployed for 2
years or more, whereas only 17.4% of those under 25 have. The figures are
30.5% and 4.6% respectively using DEFM data (Table 3.3).
The proportion on VLTU represented by those unemployed for 3
years or more is always higher for older job-seekers (Table 3.4).
The average unemployment period of job-seekers over 50 is
generally double that of those under 25 (Table 3.5).
The disadvantages suffered by older workers in this respect is due
to differences in their productive capacities and the cost of retraining. Low
employability in older workers is seen in both men and women. Furthermore
it is true throughout the period in question, 1980-1987.
8. Variations in employability do not however suffice to explain the
composition of VLTU. While a significant proportion of older job-seekers are
VLTU it is not the case that all the VLTU are in this age group. Also
included are significant numbers of under 25's and, more particularly, those
in the 25-49 group. For this reason, in explaining the composition of VLTU,
we must consider, in addition to employability, the nature of the inflows into
unemployment.! In this connection, a number of observations are in order:
The number of older VLTU has been reduced in France partly by the
intensive use of varioue early retirement schemes, such as Redundancy
Resource-Guarantees, Resignation Resource-Guarantees, Solidarity Grants,
Special Grants from the National Employment Funds, etc.
Unemployment at time t, U(t), is effectively equal to:
f"U(t) = J I(t-T) . s(t,T) . dT
where I(t-T) is the inflow into unemployment at time (t-T),
and s(t,T) is the 'survival coefficient' at time t of individuals
becoming unemployed at time t-T.
The lower the employability, the higher the survival coefficient.
For a given survival coefficient, VLTU depends on the size and
composition of the inflow into unemployment, U(t-T).
86/569
These schemes have made possible the retirement at 55 or even 50 of
people who, had they become unemployed, would have had a high probability
of becoming VLTU. The number of early retirements (50-64 years) is
estimated to have been 833,900 at the end of 1985. Such measures explain in
part the relative reduction of older job-seekers among the VLTU and the
levelling off in absolute terms within the total of ANPE-registered job-seekers
(Table 3.2 and appendices).
The reduction of the average age of the VLTU is not to be explained
solely in terms of measures taken to help older workers. It is also due to
the marked imbalance in the labour market over the last decade. While total
employment has decreased, and paid employment has remained constant
(17,965 million in March 1986 compared to 17,977 in 1982), there has been a
big increase in the size of the work-force, due to the inflow of
school-leavers and the increasing numbers of women coming into the labour
market, (Table 3.6).
Table 3.3 Percentage of VLTU (2yre or more) as proportion
PSERE
March
1986
DEFM
January
1987
Total
Under
25
17.4
4.6
25-49
28.4
12.5
50
& Over
43.8
30.5
Under
25
14.1
2.6
Males
25-491 50
l& Over
26.9
10.8
40.8
27.5
Females
Under 125-491 50
25 1 Ifc Over
20.2
6.5
29.8
14.4
48.1
35.0
Total
100
100
Table 3.4 Percentage of those unemployed 3 yrs or more as subset of 2 yrs or
more .
PSERE
March
1986
DEFM
January
1987
Total
Under
25
42.8
31.0
25-49
54.2
43.3
50
& Over
65.0
55.9
Under
25
35.2
23.1
Males
25-491 50
l& Over
52.4
43.7
64.0
53.4
Females
Under 125-491 50
25 1 1& Over
47.4
33.8
55.5
43.0
66.3
58.7
Total
100
100
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Table 3.5 Average length of unemployment (months)
PSERE
Months
March
1986
March
1980
DEFM
Days
January
1987
March
1984
Total
Under
25
13
8,6
214
213
25-49
17.4
11.7
338
270
50
& Over
25.3
19.5
595
618
Under
25
11.4
6.6
177
179
Males
25-491 50
i& Over
16.6
10.5
309
243
24.1
17.7
544
572
Females
Under
25
17.4
9.6
247
243
25-49
18.1
12.4
370
304
50
& Over
26.9
21.4
660
688
Table 3.6 Variations in the work-f orce (thousands).
Annual variation
Incidence of demographic
mvt
Incidence of change of
activity of which:
Men
Women
March 1975
- March '80
annual
average
246
216
30
-69
99
March 1980
- March '85
annual
average
134
209
-75
-135
60
March 1985
- March '86
232
159
73
-125
198
This prolonged stagnation of levels of employment, combined with a very
sustained increase in the size of the work-force explains the marked
increase, in both relative and absolute terms, of VLTU for the age group
25-49 years (Table 3.2).
It is the persistent shortage of job offers, rather than their personal
characteristics, which has thrown these job-seekers into VLTU. It is
reasonable to suppose that the majority of them, who are neither physically
nor psychologically unfit for work, would have found work in the post-war
decades of growth.
Of the young people coming onto the labour market, a proportion also
find themselves permanently excluded from work. Between 1980 and 1984, the
proportion of young people among the PSERE VLTU rose from 18 to 28%
(Table 3.2). This trend was reversed in 1985-86 by the development of
'intermediate employment' and training schemes (see below).
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9. No detailed study exists of the VLTU job-seekers. One may, however
expect them to share the characteristics of the LTU (1 year or more).
Detailed studies of the latter have consistently identified certain
characteristics which are judged to be a handicap in the competition for
work. These include poor qualifications (no examinations, even illiteracy) and
a higher incidence of health : problems.
It is also worth noting that a significant proportion of the VLTU have
never worked. This is the case, according to the Employment Survey of
March 1986, for 60% of under 25's (of whom 62% have no qualifications) and
10% of women aged 25-49.
Is it possible for these barriers to employment to be removed by policies
designed to combat LTU?
3.3 Policies to Help the Very Long Term Unemployed.
10. There are at present no national measures specifically designed to help
the VLTU. The very concept of VLTU is not recognised as far as policies to
combat unemployment are concerned.
Nonetheless, the VLTU are more or less directly affected by existing
measures and schemes to combat unemployment:
In the early 80's, the public authorities adopted a number of measures
to combat LTU, defined as registration with the ANPE for 1 year or more (see
above). By definition, the sub-set of those unemployed for 2 years or more
are included as potential beneficiaries.
Secondly, a significant proportion of VLTU can expect to benefit from
general employment policy measures, the access criteria for which are other
than length of unemployment. In practice, the most frequent criterion is age
(viz. the many training schemes for the under 25's). Other conditions do
sometimes apply, however, such as educational qualifications.
Finally, the VLTU may be expected to benefit indirectly from general
measures taken to combat unemployment, e.g., stimulation of the economy or
reductions in working hours, the effects of which are to increase employment.
Measures of the latter type, which can only have a minimal impact on
VLTU, will not be dealt with here. On the other hand we will proceed to a
detailed analysis of policies to combat LTU, and among the categorical
measures of employment policy, we will present those most affecting the VLTU.
11. Policies to combat unemployment have been developed along various
parameters. For the VLTU, as for the rest, the ideal would be that the
measures applied enable them to return to work (or start work in the case of
those who have never worked).
However, it must be stated clearly that because of the imbalance in the
labour market, the majority of the VLTU will not in the short term return to
work in the private sector, however vigorously measures are applied by the
public authorities. For this reason, it is essential that the struggle against
VLTU should have as its primary objective a guarantee of adequate resources
to the VLTU while they are awaiting work, to prevent them falling into
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poverty.
As for measures designed to facilitate a return to employment, two
approaches can be distinguished:
either the level of training is developed, to improve the competitive
position of the unemployed
or the objective is to give direct access to employment, e.g.
employment subsidies or direct job creation schemes, etc.
It would seem sensible, then, to set out those measures from which the
VLTU might benefit, according to three categories: guaranteed income,
training, and placement into employment, even though certain schemes
('alternating' training, for example) combine training and placement. Table
3.7 sets out the chronology of these three categories of measures.
(Monitoring and diagnostic measures have been included under Training).
12. Table 3.7 shows that the first large-scale operation to help the Long
Term Unemployed (1 year or more registration with the ANPE) in France was
taken in the autumn of 1982.
Most notably, this operation provided a more detailed knowledge of the
Long Term Unemployed. It began in October 1982, when the ANPE
interviewed one 30th of them. Then, between November 1982 and March 1983,
all job-seekers of more than 1 year registration on 31st August 1982 were
invited to the ANPE for an in-depth interview concerning their employment
situation. These interviews were designed to enable ANPE officers to assess
the interviewees' employment prospects. The result was as follows: in 30%
of cases direct placement was proposed; in a further 30% of cases some form
of training was proposed; and for about 35% no form of action was proposed.
It is worth noting that following this operation the ANPE set up its
permanent system of assessment and monitoring for job-seekers in their 4th
and 13th months of unemployment, as part of a preventative programme to
combat LTU and VLTU.
13. Before examining in detail the measures which may benefit the VLTU, we
feel it would be useful to review the changes which have affected the
general orientation of policies to combat long term unemployment.
Firstly, as public authorities became aware of the increasing lengths of
periods of unemployment, they widened the scope of existing measures to
include the long term unemployed, or recommended that they should be given
priority over other beneficiaries. More recently, particularly since 1986,
measures specifically designed and reserved for the long term unemployed (1
year or more) and taking account of their particular characteristics have
been developed. This is the case for all three categories: income guarantee,
training , and insertion.
10
Table 3.7 Anti-unemployment measures of benefit for VLTU.
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FRANCE
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
RESOURCE
Government prog¬
amme to combat
poverty & insec¬
urity (January)
Reform of unempl¬
oyment benefit
system (April)
Emergency arrang¬
ement for the
poor and insecure
Renewal of emerg¬
ency arrangement
for the poor &
insecure (Oct.)
Zeller Plan - to
combat poverty &
insecurity.
(October)
ORIENTATION, TRAINING,
MONITORING
Specific training programme
and grants for reinsertion
of LT unemployed (LE GARREO
Plan)
Training courses for LT un¬
employed organised by the
National Employment Fund
(October)
ANPE sets up permanent
evaluation and monitoring
of unemployed in 4th & 13th
months (April)
Extension of 'work prep¬
aration' programme to
include 18-25 year-olds -
18-25 yrs. programme
Act setting up Adaption
Contracts and Qualification
Contracts for 16-25' s (Feb)
Act setting up Work Initi¬
ation Course. (SIVP) for
16-25 ' s (January)
Specific training programme
and grants for reinsertion
LT unemployed. Modular
Courses (Known as DELEBARRE
courses) - July.
Abolition of "Work Train¬
ing" and "Work-Adapt ion"
contracts for under 26 year
olds - the former reserved
for over 26' s . Extra grant
in case of LT unemployed.
(December)
REINSERTION IN
EMPLOYMENT
Creation of TUC ,
(Travaux d'utilitie
Collective) - Oct.
Incentives for part-
time employment of
LTU (March)
Relaxation of rules
on fixed-term con¬
tracts for LT unemp¬
loyed. (April)
Extension of TUC to
include 21-25' s
unemployed for 1
year or more (July)
PLIF (Programmes
Locaux d'Insertion
des Femmes) for
women alone & with¬
out income (July)
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Table 3.7 continued
FRANCE
1987
RESOURCE
Bill for prevent¬
ion & mitigation
of LTU (Council
of Ministers, 22
April 1987).
Abolition of gap
between end of
entitlement to
insurance allow¬
ance and entitle¬
ment to state
solidarity allow¬
ance
ORIENTATION, TRAINING,
MONITORING
Bill for prevention and
mitigation of LTU (Council
of Ministers, 22 April
1987).
- Alternating Reinsertion
Programmes (5 months)
- Alternating Reinsertion
Contracts (2 years)
for LT unemployed.
REINSERTION IN
EMPLOYMENT
Extension of TUC.
Maximum period incr¬
eased from 12 to 24
months (March)
Setting up of PIL
(Programme d'Insert¬
ion Locale). (April)
Bill for Prevention
& mitigation of LTU
(Council of Minis¬
ters, 22 April 1987)
Exemption from 50*
of employers' natio-
al insurance contri¬
butions for recruit¬
ment of LT unemploy¬
ed having completed
training course or
PIL
The persistence of a high level of unemployment and its increasing
average length (337 days for DEFM and 520 days for PSERE according to the
March 1986 Survey), have resulted in a financial imbalance of the
unemployment benefit system and and increase in the number of job-seekers
having reached the end of their entitlement period. A reform of the benefit
system became inevitable, and was carried out in 1984. The new systemn may
be considered to provide adequate resources for one section of the VLTU,
namely the over 50's. But it has to be said that it has not been able to
prevent the development of poverty.
The 1984 reform introduced a dual structure into the benefit system, in
setting up a 'National Solidarity Scheme' to provide for those excluded from
the Unemployment Insurance Scheme (the long term unemployed and those
never having worked). Subsequent developments have created the necessity
for a scheme to provide for those excluded from the National Solidarity
Scheme.
From the early 1980's, initiatives began to be taken at the local level
(municipalities and departments) to deal with a rise of poverty associated
with the increases in unemployment. But in 1984-85, with the widespread
debate on the 'new poor', there came an awareness of the phenomenon at
national level. The 'Plan of Action against Poverty and Insecurity', launched
in the autumn of 1986, as well as other government programmes which
preceded it (1983, 1984 and 1985) take cognizance of these 'new poor', who
are not to be confused with 'social cases', but who through their enforced
and prolonged exclusion from work have been driven into poverty.
12
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The move towards setting up the Long Term Unemployed (1 year or more)
as a distinct category requiring specific treatment can also be seen clearly in
the field of training initiatives designed to combat unemployment.
The turning point in this area seems to have been the setting up in 1985
of Modular Training Courses, specifically for the long term unemployed,
although prior to this courses had been organised to help the long term
unemployed by the National Employment Fund, in line with recommendations
from the EEC. It was generally true nonetheless that previously the long
term unemployed had had no alternative (even assuming they could satisfy
age and other conditions) to training courses open to all unemployed,
irrespective of the length of unemployment. (It must be said that the range
of training courses is particularly diversified in France).
This trend towards specific training for the long term unemployed was
further reinforced by the passing of a bill set up ARS's (Alternating
Reinsertion Schemes) and Alternating Reinsertion Contracts (ARC's), both
reserved for those out of work for at least one year. Furthermore, these
new training measures were similar in certain respects to direct insertion
measures, as we shall see.
There were basically two types of insertion policy. First, the traditional
method of employment was used. But it should be noted that jobs for which
the engagement of the long term unemployed are encouraged (part-time work
and limited duration contracts) seem to be rather peripheral forms of
employment or provide only temporary employment.
Quantitatively more important was the development of 'intermediate
employment' as a means of giving the long term unemployed access to work.
Here again we note that the CSS (Community Service Scheme), set up in 1984
to reduce youth (under 21) unemployment, was subsequently extended to
include 21-25 year-old long term unemployed. Most recently (1987) the
intermediate employment schemes have been introduced, specifically intended
for the long term unemployed.
But the most recent concern to emerge is the desire to achieve a durable
insertion into work. This has led to the coupling together of training
courses, intermediate employment, and subsidy. Thus recent measures
envisage the financial incentive to the employment of the long term
unemployed as the direct outcome of training, and not as something distinct
and chronologically disconnected.
As has already been emphasised, no measures have so far been
specifically aimed at VLTU (more than 2 years). Recent developments show
that through a process of autonomisation a policy to ccmbat LTU has
evolved. The question now is whether the years to come will see the
emergence of a policy to deal with VLTU.
3.4 Measures Designed to Guarantee Income
14. The main substitute income available to job-seekers are the benefits
provided by the Unemployment Benefit System (appendix 3.i). Since the
latest reform in 1984 (Order of 21 March 1984 and Decree of 29 March 1984),
the French benefit system has included two schemes: the Unemployment
Insurance Scheme, funded by contributions from both employers and
13
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employees, and a Solidarity Scheme, which is entirely state-funded. The
Unemployment Insurance Scheme provides two types of allowance: a basic
allowance, and an end of entitlement allowance. These are available to
job-seekers having already worked and made sufficient contributions. The
solidarity scheme, on the other hand, is intended for job-seekers who are not
entitled to employment insurance allowance because of an excessive period of
unemployment, or because they never have been entitled. In both cases the
objective is the same: to prevent the long term unemployed falling into
poverty.
15. So the question today is not so much whether the benefit system has a
disincentive effect, but rather whether it is effective in protecting the
unemployed from poverty. In this connection it is to be noted that having
previously been in employment is a prerequisite for entitlement under the
unemployment insurance scheme, and that the longer the period of previous
employment, the longer the period of benefit.
Where benefits for the VLTU are concerned therefore, the main
distinction to be made between young first-time job-seekers and those who
have previously worked.
Young long term unemployed first-time job-seekers are not entitled to
unemployment insurance benefits. They are, on the other hand, entitled to
an Insertion Allowance under the Solidarity Scheme of 41.40F a day for a
non-renewable period of one year (equivalent to approximately one third of
the minimum wage). Thus those unemployed for two years or more cannot
claim the Insertion Allowance.
Job-seekers having previously worked receive more benefit and for a
longer period, the longer their previous period of employment and the older
they are.
Under the insurance scheme, the maximum benefit period, all allowances
taken together (Basic Allowance and End of Entitlement Allowance) is between
30 and 60 months, depending on the length of time contributions were paid
and whether the claimant is under or over 50 years old. After a period on
Basic Allowance (related to the Reference Wage), claimants receive an end of
Entitlement Allowance at a fixed rate of 65.28F or 90.78F a day (50 or 70% of
the minimum wage) if they are over 50 and have been out of work for one
year or more.
With the exception of claimants over 57-and-a-half years old, who can, in
appropriate circumstances, receive insurance benefit until retirement age (60),
the long term unemployed who have exhausted their entitlement to insurance
benefit are eligible for the Solidarity Scheme, and may receive a Solidarity
Allowance. This is granted, provided certain income conditions are met, for
six months, renewable indefinitely. It consists of 64.50F a day, but can rise
to 86F a day (respectively 50 and 66% or minimum wage) if the claimant is
over 55 and has previously worked for twenty years.
The benefit system, as reformed in 1984, is therefore far from
guaranteeing an adequate income to the VLTU. Only about one third of those
out of work for between two and three years receive benefit, and only a
quarter of those over three years. The main categories excluded are those
of young first-time job-seekers, those with an insufficient previous period in
work, and adults wishing to re-enter the labour force after an interruption
14
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(mainly women). Even when the VLTU do receive benefit, it is at a low level,
usually no more than 50% of minimum wage.
16. It would however be a mistake to assume that all the long term
unemployed are poor. For the shortcomings of the benefit system can be
compensated for by family solidarity. Indeed the main protection from
poverty today appears to be the pattern of intra-familial support, in the form
of the pooling of accommodation and resources within the domestic group. A
study carried out by LAST (cf. AGNES, M. et al. 'The income, standard of
living, and future of the long term unemployed') of 17,000 unemployed showed
that the income of households where one member was out of work is, in the
main composed of wages up to 60% (earned by partner), and pensions, while
unemployment benefits represent only one fifth of total income (other social
security benefits making up the rest). More generally, the absence of
unemployment benefit does not imply poverty when the domestic group
includes members in work. Conversely, the receipt of benefit does not
always protect from poverty when its level is low and there are no other
wage-earners.
But not all the unemployed benefit from the protection afforded by family
solidarity, e.g. those who live alone or are in poor households, and others
cannot meet living or housing costs which are excessive in relation to their
income. The manifest development of cases of poverty arising from persistent
and prolonged unemployment has thus forced local and state authorities to
produce anti-poverty plans.
17. The latest plan of action to combat poverty and insecurity (the Zeiler
Plan) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 29 October 1986, comes in the
wake of a 'Programme to Combat Poverty and Insecurity' of January 1983 and
the 'Emergency Measures to protect those in poverty and insecurity' of
winter 1984 and winter 1985. The Zeller Plan has the following four main
features (cf Circular of 29 October 1986 and appendix 3.ii):
It is a national plan designed to deal generally with the problem of
poverty and insecurity by linking the three essential facets of successful
reinsertion, namely income, employment and accommodation. It is sometimes
supported by public funds. Such initiatives come either from private
charitable organisations, such as ATD-Quart Monde, Secours Catholique, and
Secours Populaire, etc. or from local authorities, and usually seek to help the
least well-off to cope with essential recurring costs (food, rent, heating, etc).
It is specifically targetted at those over 25 who are not entitled to
unemployment benefit and in households not in receipt of a wage-income or a
substitute income.
The basis on which aid is given is intended to break with the logic of
social security - a minimum income of 2000F a month is allocated for six
months, in exchange for part-time public service work and the prospect of
other arrangements, notably training.
The application of the programme is entirely decentralised: having signed
a convention with the state, the departments are made responsible for the
constitution of dossiers, the payment of allowances to the beneficiaries, and
the signing of contracts with the host organisations. The state pays 40% of
the participants' remuneration and social security charges. Departments may
require some financial contribution from the host organisations (local councils,
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foundations, associations, public bodies etc).
The investment is considerable - 410 million francs have so far been
allocated by the state. And yet this global sum is proving inadequate. It
provides the beneficiaries (the households of the poorest unemployed) with
only a tiny monthly income (2000F, 50% of the minimum wage), and that too
only for a limited period of six months. For this reason, the plan can be no
more than an element in a much wider socio-economic programme for the
training of the long term unemployed and their reinsertion into employment.
3.5 Training Programmes
18. There are a range of training programmes which, while not specifically
designed for the long term unemployed, are nonetheless available to them.
The three most important of these are:
The programme for 18-25 year olds ('work preparation courses'). These
courses were originally reserved for 16-17 year-olds, but were extended as
early as 1972 to include first-time job-seekers from 18 to 21 years old, and
again in 1984 to 18-25 year olds. They are intended to provide participants
(usually first-time job-seekers) with the opportunity to choose a profession,
to gain access to employment and to gain qualifications.
Training-Employment Contracts, set up by the decree of 20 December 1985
and reserved for job-seekers over 26 (appendix 3.iv). These are training
courses based in part on the work-place. Their object is to facilitate
insertion into employment or to enable job-seekers to gain additional
qualifications. Depending on which of these two objects is chosen, the
training period is 200-499 hours or 500-1200 hours. Article 9 of the decree
of 20 December 1985 provides for an additional grant of up to 50% of the
normal grant available to employers who receive long term unemployed (1
year or more) participants on these courses.
Alternating contracts and training courses (appendix 3.iii). These derive
from various legislative and administrative measures, including the February
1984 act which created employment adaptation contracts and qualification
contracts, and the 3 January 1985 act which created work experience courses
(WEC's). Recent modifications (order of 17 July 1986, circular of 17 July 1986
and circular of 3 October 1986) have not fundamentally altered these three
types of alternating training. All three are designed for 16-25 year old
job-seekers.
Work experience Courses are aimed more specifically at those young
unemployed experiencing difficulties in gaining access to training or
employment. They are received by a firm and provided with a training
supervisor, with the aim of gaining experience of the work place and forming
a career plan. The contract period is between 3 and 6 months. The
participant receives a grant from the state, supplemented by the firm.
Qualification Contracts are mainly designed for young people without
qualifications or with qualifications inappropriate to employment. Courses are
intended to lead to a recognised vocational qualificiation. The distinguishing
feature of these courses is that they involve the signing of a work contract
of 6-24 months. The participant is thus an employee of the firm and is paid
a salary of between 653 and 2,884F (17-74% of the minimum wage) depending
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on age and how long the contract has run.
Finally, Employment Adaptation Contracts are available to young people
who are likely to find work quickly. Participants are again employees of the
firm and receive at least the minimum wage, the actual amount depending on
whether the contract is for a fixed or indeterminate period (minimum 6
months).
These training programmes, designed for the unemployed people in
general, are not really suitable for the specific category of the VLTU.
In particular, access to courses presupposes a general educational level
which most of the long term unemployed do not have. Thus many of them
are rejected after failing course entry selection tests.
More fundamentally, the educational gap of the long term unemployed
with respect to training is widened by a lack of motivation. Two thirds of
those questioned in the LAST survey were not applying for training, either
because they had no confidence in it (doubting that it would lead to
employment), or because they had no confidence in themselves, (feeling they
would be unable to follow a course).
19. Hence, since 1985, France has resolutely begun to set up training courses
specifically designed for the long term unemployed - Modular Courses
(appendix 3.v). This measure considerably widens the training opportunities
available to those unemployed for one year or more, in comparison with
refresher courses run by the ANPE and courses for the long term
unemployed run by the National Employment Fund.
Priority access to training courses and reinsertion courses for the long
term unemployed (known as 'modular' or Delbarre courses) is given to
job-seekers aged over 25 years. The circular of 9 July 1985 states that
priority must be given to those with the longest period of unemployment not
receiving benefit and in a precarious financial plight.
The objective of modular courses is to devise individually tailored
insertion routes linked invariably to employment. Training is the means
adopted to achieve this goal.
The average programme length is to be 600 hours, but depending on the
needs of individual participants, this can vary from 300 to 1200 hours. Of
the modules on offer to job-seekers, two are compulsory (Evaluation-Review
and job-search assistance - 5-10 hours per week), and 5 are optional
(general knowledge refresher, skills up-date, skills extention, retraining for
employment, work-place experience). Participants have the status of
vocational trainees and are paid by the state.
Management of the programme ie carried out entirely by the placement
organisation (the ANPE) - informing and receiving participants, diagnosis and
counselling on choice of modules, negotiating training with local bodies,
monitoring of progress, and devising a thorough evaluation of the programme
(reviews at course end, at 3 months and at 6 months).
Published statistics bear witness to the success of the scheme - 75,000
successful participants between September and April 1986. An analysis of
monitoring records for 51,762 participants shows that there was a majority of
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women (56%), and a significant proportion were VLTU (about one third had
been unemployed for more than two years, and 12% for more than three).
Priority had been given to the least well educated and qualified - 40% had an
educational level equivalent to that of the school leaving age, while 43% were
unskilled labourers or clerks.
The most significant result was the rate of take-up of employment at the
end of the course. An evaluation carried out on a sample of 20,000
participants from 19 regions 3 months after the end of the course break
down as follows:
One in three found work within 3 months, 2.5% of whom did so during
the course itself. Of the jobs found, 38% were open-ended contracts, and
27% were with the host employer. Women were slightly more successful than
men (33% compared to 29.6%). There were marked variations according to the
type of organisation concerned, the length of the course (those over 700
hours showed an improved success rate), and the type of course (the more
specialised ones having more success).
These results, then, given the characteristics of the participants on
modular courses, seem satisfactory - 36% of participants find work, compared
with an average of only 6% for the LTU. So the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment were certainly justified in extending the programme by
25,000 courses in the last quarter of 1986 (circular dated 15 June and 25
July 1986) and 27,000 at the beginning of 1987 (100,000 planned for the year).
Nonetheless, a number of limitations have emerged which reduce the
scope of these operations. Basically, these are:
the high cost - to make the programme available to all those unemployed
for more than two years would require seven times the number of courses
run in the first two campaigns. Taking an average of 190,000F per course,
the investment would amount to 40 million francs.
the fact that two out of every three participants cannot expect to find
work after taking a course. One third of these suffer from some handicap,
whether personal, such a poor health, or social, such as illiteracy, and them
training, even in this form, does not seem to be an effective means of giving
them access to employment.
20. It is for this reason that measures recently adopted by the Council of
Ministers (22 April 1987) combine training and employment (appendix 3.vi).
They are intended to give 30,000 LTU over 26 years of age access to one or
other of the two types of alternating course during 1987.
Alternating Reinsertion Programmes (les Stages de Reinsertion en
Alternance, SRA), which last 5 months and include 600 hours of training.
Participants (20,000 planned for 1987) are considered to be vocational
trainees, and are paid the minimum wage by the state.
Alternating Reinsertion Contracts (les Contrate de reinsertion en
Alternance, CRA) are considerably longer - two years with 600 hours of
training. There are intended to be 10,000 participants in 1987. Unlike SRA's,
CRA's involve a work contract with the employer, who pays the participant at
least the minimum wage, while the state pays the training cost and social
security contributions for one year.
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The original feature of these measures is that they bring the most
marginalised job-seekers, those who are being shut out of the job market,
into contact with employers. What's more, the state provides an incentive to
the employment of the LTU on completion of their training course, in the
form of an exemption of 50% of the social charges the employer would
normally be responsible for. This had already been applied to the emergency
plan for youth employment (order of 16 July 1986).
3.6 Reinsertion Schemes
21. The first measures specifically concerned with the employment of the LTU
followed the traditional policy of employment subsidies (appendix 3.vii). In
this respect, a financial incentive was set up for the part-time employment of
certain categories of job-seekers: those registered with the ANPE, whether
or not in receipt of benefit, and those registered for more than a year
(decree of 5 March 1985). A grant of 3000 francs is paid to the firm
provided the work contract is open-ended.
In addition, there has been a relaxation in the rules concerning the
employment of the LTU where the contract is for a fixed term (decree of 3
April 1985, circular of 3 September 1985).
Both these measures encourage the employment of the LTU in atypical
types of employment - part-time or fixed term.
Where VLTU is concerned, the efficacity of these measures is necessarily
limited, for at least two reasons:
The amount of financial incentive offered to an employer to take on the
VLTU, part-time and on open-ended contract, may be seen as low. What is
offered is less than one month's salary, which may appear derisory, in view
of the applicant's productive capacities, at least as judged by the employer.
Secondly, the August 1986 order concerning differentiated work facilities
the use of fixed term contracts, which gives employers a wider choice of
applicants for this type of work, from which they can select, to the
disadvantage of those judged to be least employable.
This selectivity, combined with a permanent shortage of jobs, has led the
public authorities to develop new forms of action to help the LTU, for which
the generic term 'intermediate employment' is used, (appendix 3.viii).
22. Intermediate employment may be defined as employment which does not
conform to the norms of the private or public sectors of the economy, with
regard to the type of work concerned, its end results, and its remuneration.
It may also be seen as a type of training. It is thus half-way between
employment and unemployment. In a number of European countries,
intermediate employment is the main means used to combat LTU - Troisième
Circuit du Travail in Belgium, the ABM programme in Germany, the Community
Programme in Britain, etc.
Compared with these countries, France began to introduce intermediate
employment later, firstly setting up the Travaux d'Utilité Collective scheme
(TUC) in October 1984 (decree of 16 October 1984), followed by the
Programmes locaux d'Insertion des Femmes Isolees (PLIF) in 1985, and finally
the Programmes d'Insertion Locale (PIL) in 1987 (decree of 3 April 1987).
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23. The Travaux d'Utilité Collective are pre-training and work preparation
schemes. Job-seekers are offered work which meets the needs of the
community, especially in the field of social action, e.g. assistance for the
elderly and for families, etc. or the environment, community equipment,
cultural matters, sporting activities etc. Article 2 of the decree of 16
October 1984 sets out a list of the bodies authorised to use TUC's - non
profit making bodies, charitable foundations, regional community associations,
and public establishments. This list was extended by the decrees of 1 March
1985 and 26 July 1985 to include Social Security bodies, Mutual Societies and
worker-management liaison committees.
The work required is 20 hours per week (an average of 80 hours a
month). Participants are vocational trainees and receive 1200F a month,
(about a third of the minimum wage), paid by the state, though the host
body may pay a supplement of 500F a month.
Since 1984, two major modifications have been made:
Originally reserved for 16-21 year-olds, the TUC's were opened, by the
decree of 26 July 1985, 22-25 year-old job-seekers registered for over a year.
The original duration of 3-6 months was extended to 24 months by the
decree of 20 March 1987.
24. Access to intermediate employment for the LTU has been improved in
recent years by two new types of programme:
The PLIF (Programmes Locaux d'Insertion des Femmes Isolees), whose
objective is the re-employment of women living alone and without means.
Priority is given to older women who have been out of work longest. They
are entitled to 760 hours, including up to 225 hours of training. The most
recent programme (autumn 1986) incolved 4,000 women.
The PIL (Programmes d'Insertion Locale) are re-employment programmes
designed for over 25 year-old job-seekers in receipt of the Solidarity
Allowance (i.e. LTU). They involve 80-120 hours a month for 6 months,
renewable once. In exchange for community work for one of the authorised
bodies listed in the TUC decrees, the participant receives, from the state, at
least the equivalent of the Solidarity Allowance.
It is important to note the stipulation that PIL applicants must be in
receipt of the Solidarity Allowance. Given the rules of the benefit system,
the VLTU may well not be entitled to this allowance, and are thus likely to
be excluded from the PIL programme.
25. The effectiveness of these programmes may be judged by examining the
one which has been used most, and which has been subjected to statistical
monitoring, namely the TUC. Evaluations carried out in 1985 show that
320,000 young people had taken part, 84% of whom had been registered with
the ANPE, 8% of these for more than a year. There was thus a significant
impact on youth unemployment levels. The number of under-25's registered
fell by 4% from December 1984 to December 1985, while in that period the
number of adults in the 25-49 age range increased by 12%. Similarly, the
effect on youth re-employment was considerable - 28% of those having
completed a TUC found work, a third of these on open-ended contracts.
Nonetheless, the proportion still seeking work and re-registered with the
ANPE remains high (38%).
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Even though the results in terms of permanent reinsertion in
employment are far from satisfactory, intermediate employment would appear
to be essential, given the stagnation in levels of employment and the severe
competition between job-seekers which results, a situation which first and
foremost penalises the VLTU. It is true that these forms of work involve the
risk of those concerned being trapped in unskilled temporary work as a
substitute for 'normal' work. But such a risk is admittedly less serious than
that of VLTU itself, viz erosion of productive capacities, loss of motivation,
pauperisation and marginalisation.
3.7 Conclusion
26. The persistence of a high level of unemployment increases the risk of the
emergence of two lasses of unemployed - alongside those with a high
employability level, an increasing proportion, those who have been without
work longest, would have no chance of ever finding employment.
There are two sets of forces at play in the creation within the body of
the unemployed of a separate core of those permanently excluded from work.
On the one hand there is the process of selection of individuals in the job
market. It is well known that the longer someone is out of work the less
chance they have of finding work, due to factors such as loss of contact
with the world of work, psychological difficulties, qualifications becoming
obsolete, etc. But the process is, on the other hand, also linked to the
macro-economic factor of job shortage.
The long term exclusion from employment of a growing number of
individuals has led public authorities to combat the problem by various
means. These include measures to prevent creation of LTU, such as, for
example, retraining contracts [contracts de conversion], which have recently
been introduced in France and are designed to help redundant workers find
other employment, if necessary, undertaking further training. Despite this,
long term exclusion from employment is already a reality. This is why
preventive anti-LTU measures do not obviate the need for post hoc action.
27. It is now recognised that general anti-unemployment policies are
inadequate to cope with LTU, and a fortiori with VLTU. It is obviously
desirable that measures undertaken, nationally and regionally, to encourage
the creation of new industry and to stimulate job creation should be
continued. But it would be unreasonable to expect them to have any
perceptible effect on VLTU. The beneficiaries will instead be the rising
generations coming onto the job market, together with the short term
unemployed. A policy of growth cannot by itself therefore ensure the return
to work of the long term unemployed, given the present profound imbalance
in the labour market. Measures aimed specifically at those who have been
longest out of work are therefore indispensable.
In this perspective, recent years have seen the emergence in France of a
policy to combat LTU (cf sections 3.3 to 3.4). Such measures have no real
effect on the macro-economic job shortage. Their object is to improve the
position of the long term unemployed waiting in the queue, which may, of
course, produce a knock-on effect on other categories of job-seekers.
This policy to combat LTU has come into being in stages. At first
eligibility, based on the criterion of one year or more out of work as simply
tacked on to existing schemes, which were not originally designed for the
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long term unemployed. Such was the case for the TUC (Travaux d'Utilité
Collective) scheme, first set up for 16-21 year-olds, only later extended to
include 21-25'e out of work for a year or mote. But in the last two years
particularly, there have been innovations. Examples are Modular Training
and, more recently, Alternating Programmes and Contracts. These are not
adaptations, but schemes specifically designed for the LTU.
Increasing LTU has thus given rise to an anti-LTU policy, using more
and more specialised instruments to deal with the particular characteristics of
the LTU.
Will the growth in VLTU in turn give rise to a specific policy designed,
to help this particular category? The high and rising rate of those out of
work for two years or more makes this an urgent question.
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APPENDIX 3.i The Unemployment Benefit System
Unemployment Insurance Scheme - Solidarity Scheme
References: Order of 21 March 1984 - Decree of 29 March 1984 - Convention
of 19 November 1985.
Unemployment Insurance Scheme
2 types of allowance: Basic Allowance (BA): exclusively for workers made
redundant or having finished a fixed term contract or following a legitimately
motivated resignation.
entitled to BA.
End of Entitlement Allowance (EA) - for claimants not
Period of previous
contributions + age
3 out of last 12
months
6 months out of
last 12
under 50 -
50 & over -
12 out of last 24
months
under 50 -
50 & over -
24 out of last 36
months
50 - under 55
55 and over
BA
Daily
amount
33.49F
+30% RS*
44.66F
+
40* RS
Period in
months ·*·
3
10
15
19
33
33
45
EEA
Daily Period in
amount months 1
_
65.28F
or
90.78F
increase
after 1
year
unemployed
and over
55
7
12
16
24
24
27
Maximum
Period,
combined
BA & EEA
(months)
3
15
21
30
45
45
60
*RS = Reference salary, based on salary of 12 calendar months preceding last
paid day in work.
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Allowance
Solidarity Scheme
Beneficiaries Daily
Amount
Period
Insertion Allowance
(IA)
16-25 year olds seeking
first job
16-25 year olds having
worked more than 3 & less
than 6 months in preceding
12
41.40F 1 year
non¬
renew¬
able.
Solidarity Allowance
(SA)
claimants having exhausted
maximum periods of benefit
under insurance scheme
long term unemployed 64.50F
6 months
unlimited
renewal
if over 55 and with 20
years in work previously 86. OOF indeter¬
minate
if having
voluntarily
abandoned
search for
employment.
1 These periods include possible prolongations permitted by the ASSEDICS.
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APPENDIX 3.ii The Plan of Action to Combat Poverty and Insecurity (The
Zeller Plan)
Reference: Council of Ministers, 29 October 1986.
4 types of measure:
- a state/local authority agreement on the allocation of a Minimum
Income .
- Housing (assistance with rent arrears, prevention of gas and
electricity cut-offs to households in difficulty, setting up
of F.A.R.G. (REHOUSING AND GUARANTEE FUND).
- Grants to charities for food aid
- specific measures to help LTU not receiving benefit
SPECIFIC MEASURES TO HELP LTU NOT RECEIVING BENEFIT
Beneficiaries Those over 25 not entitled to benefit and in a household
without revenue from employment or a substitute revenue (other than housing
or family allowances)
Objective To provide an income of at least 2000F a month in
exchange for part-time community service work, with a view to participation
in other schemes (training, intermediate employment etc.)
Duration Six months
Type of Contract Agreement between the state and the department
concerned. The state respoonsible for 40% of the remuneration and national
insurance contributions.
25
86/569
APPENDIX 3. iii Alternating Training for 16-25 year-olds
References: Act of 24 Feb. 1984 (Adaption contract and qualification
contract)
Act of 3 Jan. 1985 (Work experience courses)
Order of 17 July 1986, circulars of 17 July and 3 October 1986.
Beneficiaries
Objective
Type & period
of contract
Minimum
training
period.
Status of
participant
Monthly
Salary/
allowance
Exemption
from employe¬
rs obligation
to pay social
charges .
Work Experience
Courses (WEC)
18-25' s with part¬
icular insertion
problems, after
lengthy search for
work.
- Work place exper¬
ience
- formulation of a
career project.
No work contract -
3-6 month course
25 hours per month
Trainee
State:
16-18 yrs. 535. OOF
18-21 yrs. 1.185.30F
21-25 yrs. 1,580.40F
Employer:
16-18 yrs. 17% of MW*
18-25 yrs. 27% of MW*
100%, for courses
beginning before
1.2.87.
!
I
Adaption Contracts 1
18-25' s , seeking work, '
likely to find a place
quickly.
rapid adaption through t
extra training
!
fixed or open period
work contract (min 1
200 hours min. out of
work time.
Employee
At least 80% of the
legal minimum wage
and the MW* during the
contract if it is of
fixed period or during
training if this is of
indeterminate duration.
100% for contracts
signed before 1.2.87
for period of contract.
1
Qualification
Contracts
18-25' s without
qualifications ,
seeking work.
acquisition
of quali¬
fication
Fixed period
contract 6-
24 months.
25% min. of
total period of
contract.
Employee
17%-75% of
MW, depending
on age and how
long on
contract .
100% in first
year, 50% in
second year.
*MW - Minimum Wage (National) (SMIC).
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APPENDIX 3.iv Training-Employment Contracts
References: Decrees of 19 May 1983 and 20 December 1985.
Beneficiaries 1 Job-seekers, 26 years and under.
Objective 1 To facilitate insertion of job-seekers having
1 particular difficulties, or needing extra
1 qualifications.
Period of 1 Insertion in Employment Qualifications
Contract & 1 Contract: min. 12 months. Contract: min. 24 months
Training 1 Training: 200-499 hours Training: 500-1200 hours
1 (in work time) (in work time)
State Aid 1 46F per training hour per employee, paid to employer.
1 A supplementary payment up to 50% of the aid may be
1 paid for job-seekers registered for over 1 year.
27
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APPENDIX 3. ν The Specific Programme of Training and Reinsertion Assistance
for the LT Unemployed: Modular Courses
References: Circular, 9 July 1985; Circulars, 20 June and 25 July 1986.
Beneficiaries - LTU, priority to over 25's and those registered
longest and not receiving benefit.
Objective - to encourage the insertion of the LTU by
increasing their employability through an individualised
course of training.
Nature and period of training - A co-ordinated set of modules, totalling
on average 600 hours (min. 300, max. 1200), at the rate of 36 hours a week.
They should (a) take place with one or more training bodies and/or at
the work-place, (b) be individualised, and (c) include whenever possible,
a period of work experience.
The training modules - depending on the individual, training consists of
one or more of the following modules: (a) review/ evaluation - a compulsory
module which determines the remainder of the course, (b) employment
re-orientation, (c) educational and/or vocational refresher, (d) skills
up-date, (e) skills extension, (f) job-search techniques and preparation
of curriculum vitae (compulsory).
Funding - provided entirely by the state, which (a) remunerates
participants as vocational trainees, and (b) pays the administrative
costs of 20F per hour per participant on average. The scheme is administered
by the ANPE.
Implementation of the scheme - Sept. - April 1986: 75,000 participants
passed; last quarter of 1986: 25,000; first quarter 1987: 27,000;
planned for 1987 in total: 100,000.
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APPENDIX 3. vi A Parliamentary Bill to Prevent and Combat LTU
References: Council of Ministers, 22 April 1987.
The main points of the bill are:
- the abolition of the gap between the end of entitlement to
unemployment insurance benefit and entitlement under the
Solidarity scheme.
- an incentive to recruit the LTU by exemption from 50%
of the employer's national insurance contributions for one year
where the employee recruited has completed a training course
or the PIL programme and had been LTU.
two new types of alternating training course, reserved for LT
unemployed over 26 years old.
ALTERNATING REINSERTION PROGRAMMES AND CONTRACTS
Programmes Contracts
Beneficiaries LTU over 26 years old
Period 5 months 2 years
300 hours work-place 600 hours
training, plus 300 hours training
in a training centre.
Status of Participant vocational trainee employee
Remuneration
Target for 1987
by the state, at minimum
wage
20,000 courses
by the employer,
at at least
minimum wage. The
state pays train¬
ing fees and
social charges
for one year.
10,000 contracts
Total cost 1100 million francs.
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APPENDIX 3. vii Incentives for the Recruitment of the LTU:
Part-time Work and Fixed Term Contracts .
Financial incentives for the recruitment to part-time employment of certain
categories of job-seekers.
Reference: decree of 5 March 1985.
Category of applicant ANPE - registered job-seekers, whether
or not in receipt of benefit, or
those registered for more than 1 year.
Grant and conditions 6,000F for every part-time employee
engaged by 31 December 1985, (open
contract) 3,000F for those engaged
1.1.86 - 31.12.87.
Period Part-time open contract: 18-32 hours/
week, or 1/5 of normal working time
for that job.
Remuneration By the employer - the state to top up
in case remuneration less than benefit.
Fixed Term Contracts for the LTU
Reference: decree of 3 April, 1985 - circular, 3 September 1985.
Category of applicant ANPE - registered for more than 1 year.
Type of contract Fixed term, 6-12 months, determined
at time of signing.
Renewable once, but cumulative total
no more than 2 years.
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APPENDIX 3. viii Intermediate Employment - TUC (Travaux d'Utilité Collective)
Reference: decrees, 16 & 25 October 1984, 1 March 1985, 26 July 1985,
20 March 1987.
Beneficiaries 16-21' s without work contract, seeking
work, not in training
21-25' s, ANPE-registered over 1 year.
Objectives work 'pre-training' - carrying out of work
to meet community-defined local needs.
Period 3 months - 2 years, 20 hours a week
(80/month)
TUC organisers may offer optional training
Participant receives work experience
certificate.
Authorised bodies Non-profit making bodies; charitable
foundations; regional community associations
state schools; pension funds and
retirement institutions; worker-
management liaison committees; directors of
public services.
Remuneration and status 1,250F a month, from the state. Host bodies
may supplement up to 500F a month.
PLIF: Programmes Locaux d'Insertion des Femmes
Reference: Circular, 9 July 1985
Beneficiaries Women living alone with no income - priority
to older women and those out of work longest.
Objective To encourage their return to work
Period 760 hours, including max. 225 training.
31
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PIL: Programmes d'Insertion Locale
Reference: decree, 3 April 1987
Beneficiaries LTU of 25 and over in receipt
of specific solidarity allowance.
Objective work re-orientation, or preparation for
work requiring different qualifications.
Period community service- type work, 80-120 hours
a month for 6 months with vocational
training. Renewable once.
Authorised bodies as for TUC
Remuneration and status Paid by state - equal to solidarity allowance,
plus 500-750F a month expenses (travel etc.)
paid by host body.
32
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4.1. Introduction
In the 1970s unemployment was relatively low in the Netherlands,
although in the second half of this decade people were well aware of an
unemployment problem. However, since 1980 there has been a dramatic
increase in unemployment (Diagram 4.1), which has been accompanied by a
more than proportional growth of long term unemployment. For some years
now the share of the long term (> 1 year) and the very long term {£ 2
years) unemployed in total unemployment is more than 50 per cent and more
than 30 per cent, respectively (Diagram 4.2). Table 4.1 shows an estimate of
the distribution of registered unemployment by duration for the period
1980-1986.
The rise in unemployment has led to successive changes in interpretation
of "long term unemployment". In the 1970s the long term unemployed were
considered to be those unemployed for more than six months. In the early
1980s this was moved up to one year and in recent years a usual
interpretation is an unemployment spell of at least two years.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of
several characteristics of the very long term unemployed and related
statistical information. Some conclusions will be drawn on the most important
factors that influence the probability of an unemployed person arriving in a
situation of (very) long term unemployment. In section 4.3 attention is paid
to the Dutch government policies towards the long term unemployed. For
brevity long term unemployment or long term unemployed will be abbreviated
to LTU and very long term unemployment or very long term unemployed to
VLTU.
4.2. The very long term unemployed: facts and figures
4.2.1 The measure of unemployment
In the Netherlands there is only one source of frequently published
figures concerning unemployment, namely the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment. These figures are based on the registers of the public labour
office exchange services. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in this
paper refer to registered unemployment and are provided by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment.
Recent research has pointed out that registered unemployment differs to
a considerable extent from actual unemployment (SRB, 1986). Reasons are,
among others, lags in new registrations and in terminations of registrations
and the fact that persons with a temporary job or a job for only a few
hours per week, remain registered as unemployed. The latter is also true for
the VLTU, so that by this reason VLTU is overestimated. On the other hand
registration can be ended and renewed, without actual changes in the labour
market position of the unemployed individual, which causes an
underestimation of VLTU (see also Annex 4.B.
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To give an impression of differences between registration figures with
other sources, some information is presented for March-May 1985. At that
time the number of registered unemployed was 806,000. The Labour Force
Sample Survey indicated a number of 751,000 unemployed, of which 611,000
were registered and wanted a job for more than 20 hours per week. The
number of people in receipt of unemployment benefits was 693,000 at that
time. However, the conclusion that registered unemployment figures give an
Table 4.1
< 1 year
1-2 years
2-3 years
3-4 years
> 4 years
Composition of the registered unemployed by duration, 1980-1986
(years' averages)
1980
77
13
5
2
3
100
1981
78
14
4
2
2
100
1982 1983
69
21
6
2
2
100
56
26
11
4
3
100
1984a)
47
22
15
9
7
100
1985 1986
46
20
14
10
10
100
46
19
11
9
15
100
Ν (χ 1000) 325 480 655 801 822 761 711
a) The figures 1984 and later are not fully comparable with the preceding
years because of a change in estimation method.
Diagram 4.1. Unemployment in the Netherlands (national definitions)
a) old definition
b) new definition (1982)
1970 72 7ft 76 78 80 82 8ft 86
86/569
Diagram 4.2 Unemployment and the share of long term unemployment, 1971-1985
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overestimation of actual unemployment would be too simple. In reality thinge
are more complex. A well known fact is, for example, the hidden
unemployment among the (officially) disabled. Hence, although the figures
presented in this paper are not a 'correct' reflection of reality, they are the
best available.
4.2.2 Age and sex
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the registered VLTU by age and sex.
Before conclusions can be drawn from these figures, some remarks have to be
made.
A first special category are the young. Many of them entered the labour
market only a short time ago, bo that they cannot belong to the VLTU by
definition. Thus, a better measure for the position and prospects of
unemployed youth is the probability of. leaving unemployment. But in that
case also, the position of the youngest age group is relatively favourable
(see Annex 4.B).
A second comment is needed with respect to the oldest age group. Since
1984 unemployed persons over 57.5 years are no longer obliged to register,
because they have little chance of finding a job and because of the priority
given to reduce youth unemployment. As a consequence the number of VLTU
of over 50 years is approximately 35,000 lower (30,000 men and 5,000 women)
than it would have been without this administrative measure.
The position of women deserves special attention. According to the Dutch
social security system all workers are entitled to unemployment benefits, but
only for a limited period. After expiration of this period the right on
financial support depends on family income. Hence, after some years of
unemployment most married women are no longer in receipt of any payments
and an important motive for registration has gone. This is particularly true
as the chance of finding a job through mediation of public labour exchange
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services will be very small. * As a consequence many women with an
unemployment spell of more than two years are not registered. This effect
can be seen most clearly from Table 4.2 sections C and D. For the younger
age groups relatively more women belong to the VLTU, but with rising age
the (statistical) position by sex is reversed.
Hence, two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.2. Firstly, the
incidence of VLTU increases with age. Especially the position of the
unemployed of over 50 years is very unfavourable.
However, because of the relatively large cohorts and high participation
rates of younger age groups, the absolute numbers of VLTU are higher for
them. Secondly, women have more chance to become VLTU than men. This is
obscured by the non-registration effect mentioned before. But even if one
would make a correction for this effect, the absolute number of long term
unemployed women is much lower than that of men. This is due to the lower
female participation rate.2 The only exception in this respect is the
youngest age group, where the female participation rate is relatively high
compared to men in the same age group.
The unfavourable position of older workers and women can be illustrated
also by recent trends in VLTU (Table 4.3). The renewed employment growth
has led to a decreasing number of VLTU since 1985-86. However, this
general decline is the result of an important reduction for the young and for
men aged 25-39 and a further increase for the other categories.
The detailed information, as presented in Table 4.2. and Table 4.3 is only
available for the last few years. However, more limited information for the
early 1980s (see Annex 4.A) indicates that the unfavourable position of
women, as mentioned in this paragraph, is at least partly due to a cyclical
effect. The increase in VLTU until 1984 seems to have hit men more strongly
than women. In February 1982 the share of women in VLTU was 35 per
cent. This percentage fell to 27 in February 1984 and rose again to 31 in
February 1987. Hence, male unemployment is obviously more sensitive to
fluctuations in economic activity.
1· For only 10 per cent of the unemployed who are actively looking for
a job, the public agency is the most important way of job search
(Allaart et al., 1987).
2· In the Netherlands, the participation rate of women in the age of 15-64
years is low, compared to most other industrialised countries. At the end
of 1986 it was 43 per cent.
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Table 4.2 The very long term unemployed by age and sex (February 1987)
A. Persons (x 1000)
Age Male Female Total
<23 10 14 24
23-29 39 26 65
B. % by sex
53
38
29
18
12
7
30-39 71
40-49 50
>50 36
15-64 169 77 246
<23
23-29
30-39
40-49
>50
42
59
75
77
80
58
41
25
23
20
100
100
100
100
100
15-64 69 31 100
C. % by age
<23
23-29
30-39
40-49
>50
6
23
31
23
17
18
34
24
15
9
10
26
29
20
15
15-64 100 100 100
D. % of total number of unemployed in respective groups
<23
23-29
30-39
40-49
2:50
12
32
45
48
58
18
35
36
36
52
15
33
41
45
56
15-64 37 31 35
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Table 4.3
Men
<25
25-39
40-49
>50
15-64
Recent trends in the composition of the very long term
unemployed
Thousands of VLTU Change in %
Feb. 1985 Feb. 1986 Feb. 1987 1985-86 1986-87
28.4
88.1
34.3
23.8
25.6
88.9
37.6
27.8
20.0
81.7
38.2
29.3
-10
+ 1
+10
+17
-22
- 8
+ 2
+ 5
174.6 179.9 169.3 + 3 - 6
Women
<25
25-39
40-49
>50
15-64
28.3
30.6
8.8
5.0
27.7
33.7
10.0
6.0
23.4
35.0
11.5
7.2
- 2
+10
+14
+20
-16
+ 4
+15
+20
72.7 77.4 77.1 + 6
4.2.3 Education
The incidence of VLTU differs considerably across levels of education.
Table 4.4 shows the composition of the VLTU by global education levels. It is
well known that poorly educated people have a relatively weak position in the
labour market. In periods of unemployment they are often heavily hit,
Table 4.4 The very long term unemployed by level of education, February 1987
Only basic education a)
Uncompleted continuation °)
Completed continuation,
of which: low level c)
medium level ")
high level e)
Total
Number
(1000
persons
79
45
122
246
)
76
27
19
As a percentage of
total unemployment
(%) in
(32)
(18)
(50)
(31)
(11)
( 8)
(100)
respective category
49
35
29
30
27
29
35
Notes: a) primary school (age 4-12); b) secondary as well as higher
education; c) junior vocational/intermediate secondary;
d) senior vocational/higher secondary/pre-university;
e) higher vocational/university
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because employers prefer better educated employees if they have a wide
choice. Therefore it is not surprising that a large proportion of the
unemployed with only a basic education belong to the VLTU. It is more
striking that so many better educated people are unemployed for such a long
time, and that there is hardly any difference in position of the three
distinguished levels of completed continuation.
This can partly be explained by the fact that especially in higher
education there has been insufficient attention for work opportunities.
Another, related, factor is the rather abrupt change in prospects for certain
types of public sector jobs, mainly in social services. Long term
unemployment for this category is mainly concentrated among graduates of
social, cultural, pedagogical and political studies. Figures, published
quarterly by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, indicate that the
recent decline in VLTU is completely concentrated among unemployed who
have a type of education for which the job opportunities are connected to
fluctuations in economic activity such as education in technical and
administrative/commercial direction.
4.2.4 Skill/occupation
There is little reliable information about the relation between skill and
occupation and unemployment spells. Some figures are available dating from
April 1986. These indicate that VLTU is of most frequent occurence for
low-skilled workers. Important examples are unskilled or low-skilled
construction workers and navvies, factory workers, packers and
warehousemen. For women also domestics and barmaids. There is no doubt
that low-skilled workers without specific training are more likely to be
affected by VLTU, This is in line with the results in 4.2.3 concerning levels
of education.
4.2.5 Nationality
As most other Western European countries the Netherlands have a
significant number of immigrant workers. Some of them have Dutch
nationality, but belong to the ethnic minorities (Surinam/Moluccas).
Compared to indigenous Dutch workers, most of these groups are confronted
with relatively high unemployment rates. In 1986 the share of non-Dutch
nationalities in the registered unemployment and in the labour force was 9.5
and 4.5 per cent, respectively.
The proportion of VLTU is also relatively high (Table 4.5). This is true
for all ethnic minorities. The major cause of the unfavourable position of
these groups seems to be their low level of education. It is estimated that
36 per cent of the indigenous Dutch unemployed is educated only at a basic
level or has not completed any continuation. This percentage varies from 50
for immigrants from EG-countries to 85-90 for immigrants from Morocco and
Turkey. However, the differences between these categories can not fully be
explained by level of education. Other factors must play a part too. There
are plain indications that in many cases recruitment is discriminative (Brasse
et al., 1986; Veeman, 1985).
A serious problem is the position of the youth of ethnic minorities. The
incidence of VLTU among the second generation of immigrants is alarming. A
few years ago 56% of the young unemployed of Moluccan origin (15-30 years)
were unemployed for 2 years or longer. For low education levels this was
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Table 4.5 The very long term unemployment by nationality and proportions
in total unemployment (April 1986)
Number As percentage of
(1000 total unemployment
persons) in respective category
Indigenous Dutch 215 34
Surinam/Moluccas ,
Dutch nationality 9 42
EG-countries 4 35
Morocco 7 44
Turkey 10 42
Surinam 1 46
Other nationalities 6 35
68% (Veeman, 1985). Combined with a general unemployment rate which is
more than double the rate for the indigenous Dutch, the picture is more or
less disastrous. There has been no comparable extensive investigations into
the position of the second generation of other minorities, but probably they
have a very similar position. The causes of this misery are complex, but an
insufficient cultural adaption and problems with the Dutch language seem to
play an important part.
4.2.6 Geographical distribution
In the Netherlands regional differences in unemployment are rather
limited. This is also true for VLTU. In Table 4.6, Section A, figures are
presented for the 12 Dutch provinces. In addition Section Β shows how the
situation is in the four biggest cities. In the provinces Groningen, Overijssel
and Gelderland the unemployment situation is worse than in the rest of the
country (see Table 4.6). However, the most significant concentration of VLTU
is found in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In both cities, but also in other
urban areas, unemployment is strongly concentrated in a limited number of
districts. This is caused by the fact that some of the most underprivileged
labour market groups just live in these older parts of the cities where
traditional employment has disappeared, and where rents are low. These
underprivileged labour market groups consist of ethnic minorities as well as
lowly qualified and unqualified indigenous Dutch from the lower social
strata. Work-ethos of the former group is generally strong, but there is
some evidence that among the latter some kind of unemployment-subculture
exists in which striving for a job is hardly considered as normal.
A third group living in the older city districts are the young. Especially
in Amsterdam and less frequently in other cities, there is a youth-subculture
according to which unpaid work or paid work in the informal economy is
preferred to that in the formal economy. Many of them are registered as
unemployed in order to receive social security benefits.
It must be noted that beside these marginalised labour market groups
there are large groups of VLTU who are victims of industrial restructuring.
This is true for the provinces of Groningen, Overijssel, Gelderland and
Limburg where traditional regional industries such as cardboard, clothing,
10
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Table 4.6 Geographical distribution
February 1987
A. Provinces, including
Groningen
Friesland
Drenthe
North
Overijssel
Flevoland
Gelderland
East
Utrecht
Noord-Holland
Zuid-Holland
Zeeland
West
Noord-Brabant
Limburg
South
The Netherlands
the four bi¡
Number
(1000
persons )
14
10
6
30
18
2
34
54
11
40
50
3
104
33
20
53
241
of the very '
igest cities
% of the
Netherlands
6
4
2
12
8
1
14
23
4
17
21
1
43
14
8
22
100
long term
% of
unemp
ι unemployed
the regional
»loyed
38
32
30
33
38
20
39
38
28
33
35
25
33
34
35
34
34
B. Four biggest cities (Province)
Amsterdam (Noord-Holland)
Rotterdam (Zuid-Holland)
Den Haag (Zuid-Holland)
Utrecht (Utrecht)
Total of four cities
27
22
12
6
68
11
9
5
3
28
39
43
34
30
38
textile, and shoe industry and mining disappeared or dwindled. It is also
true for the cities where for example the former workers on the shipyards
are unable to find a new job in the expanding service sector (SRB, 1987).
11
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4.2.7 Probability of finding a job
People become long term unemployed because they have little chance to
get a job. The longer a person has been unemployed, the smaller the
probability of leaving unemployment (see also Annex 4.B). Among the
category less than 1 year unemployed some 40 per cent find a job within a
year. This is 18 per cent for the VLTU. Recent figures for March 1987
indicate that during this month 8 per cent of the less than 1 year
unemployed and 1.5 per cent of the VLTU succeeded in finding a job.
There is no general agreement on the answer to the question whether the
length of individual unemployment spells is an independent negative factor
with respect to the probability of finding a job. The answer will be
affirmative, if only a limited dumber of characteristics (e.g. age, sex,
education, skill) of the unemployed is concerned. However, the outcome will
be uncertain, if the possibility of specific individual characteristics (e.g.
unsocial behaviour, physical or mental handicaps) is taken account of.
4.3. Government-policy regarding long term unemployment
In 1979 policy-makers' attention was drawn to an economic study that
revealed the negative relationship between the duration of unemployment and
the probability of the unemployed to re-enter the work-force. The longer
the period of unemployment, the smaller the probability to find a job (Van 't
Eind and Ravestein, 1979). From that moment on, LTU became an issue of
government-policy in the Netherlands.
However, LTU was still considered as a consequence of the discrepancies
between skill requirements and the qualifications of the labour force, being
the most important labour market problem of the moment. Those with an
inadequate vocational training would have a bigger chance to become
unemployed for a long time. Especially women, youths, older people, lowly
qualified, racial minorities and handicapped people were considered to be the
most disadvantaged groups. Policy was aimed at ameliorating the labour
market position of the hard to place members of these groups. Although
many of them were unemployed for a long time, policy failed to design
specific measures for the LTU. According to the 1985 Annual Report of the
Department of Labour Market Policy of the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment the most characteristic feature of LTU policy was to give
preferential treatment to the LTU in the application of regular labour market
measures. Only in 1984 specific measures for LTU had been designed.
The whole of regular labour market measures can be divided in three
groups, corresponding to three phase activities of public labour market
agencies in favour of job searching people go through. The first phase is to
offer intermediary services: the labour agency tries to bring the job
searcher into contact with an employer offering a suitable job. After a time,
when intermediary services seem to unsuccessful, the second phase is
reached. The labour agency takes into consideration training and so called
job placement measures, being mostly wage-cost subsidies. Thirdly, if these
measures also fail to be successful, job creation programmes come into
consideration. Training and placement measures are supposed to be most
important for people who are unemployed for 3 to 6 months, while job
creation schemes are meant for people who are unemployed for more than 6
months.
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4.3.2 Placement Measures
The Placement Measures (Plaatsingsbevorderende Maatregel, PBM) had its
start in 1981 and were a combination of three different wage-cost subsidies
(30% wage-cost subsidy, provisional measure for long term unemployed,
temporary wage-cost subsidy for youngsters). The objective of PBM was to
stimulate lasting employment of hard to place job seekers in the private
sector. The measure provided a one year wage-cost subsidy to employers,
the amount being dependent on the age of the unemployed and the duration
of their unemployment. Table 4.7 offers information about the number of new
applications of PBM and its predecessors.
It seems that only a small proportion of the unemployed was reached with
the measures. PBM was applied in many cases of LTU (> 12 months). In
1982 this concerned 43% and in 1984 65% of all new applications. The
effectiveness with regard to reducing LTU seems to be marginal, however.
In 1982 as well as in 1984 only 1,6% of those being unemployed for one year
or more could profit. No data are available about the extent of the VLTU (>
2 years).
In 1985 the government ended PBM. According to the Department of
Labour Market Policy the main reason was doubt about the effectiveness of
PBM, but probably the actual reasons have been of a slightly different
nature. The international tendency to strict restraints on public expenditure
has led to a wide spread cut in targeted wage subsidy programmes, because
they are rather expensive while there is no communis opinio about their
effectiveness. Hence, the judgement of wage subsidy programmes has
Table 4.7 New applications of placement measures (1975-1986)
Year 30?á wage-cost
subsidy
A Β
Prov. measure
for LTU
\. Β
Temporary
wage-subsidy
for youth
A Β
PBM
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
3.3
2.9
4.0
4.2
2.9
2.1
1.5
1.3
1.0
1.5
1.6
1.0
0.6
0.3
0.7
1.6
1.7
1.2
4.6
9.7
8.6
4.0
1.6
2.6
2.3
1.9
1.6
2.1
3.1
2.6
1.8
1.0 2.4
9.3
7.3
7.8
7.4
0.9
2.3
1.1
1.1
1.2
Notes: A = number of new applications (x 1000)
Β = number of new applications in % of unemployment of the
target group
Sources: 1975-1984: De Wachter and Visser (1986)
1985: Annual Report Department of Labour Market Policy
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changed with a more general shift to positive adjustment policies, as strongly
promoted by the OECD (OECD, 1984).
In 1986 PBM has been replaced by a new scheme, the Measure to Support
Adjustment to the Labour Force (Maatregel Ondersteuning Arbeidsinpassing,
MOA), which will be discussed in section 4.3.7.
4.3.3 Job Creation Schemes
The objective of Job Creation Schemes (Werkgelegenheidsverruimende
Maatregel, WVM) was to create additional jobs in order to ameliorate the
labour market position of the participants. This objective had to be attained
by subsidising a great deal of the wage-costs. As was the case with PBM,
WVM was the result of the combination of several measures in the late 1970s.
Among these were the Temporary Job Measure (TAP), the Interim Measure for
young unemployed and Experimental employment projects for women (Table
4.8).
At the start in 1979 the target group of WVM (WVM '79) was formed by
all those who were unemployed for more than six months. The measure
proved to be profitable especially for young women. Male participants were
concentrated in the age category of 23-45. With the help of WVM '79, jobs
were created in the non-profit sector. Administrative and nursing jobs were
of growing importance, while the share of technical jobs was declining
(Blomsma, 1987). WVM has been revised in 1982. On the one hand two target
groups were specified. The measure was applicable to people aged younger
than 23 years who were unemployed during more than 9 months and for
people older than 23 years with a period of unemployment of more than 12
months. The employer would receive an age-dependent subsidy with a
Table 4.8 New applications of Job Creation Measures (1975-1986)
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Notes
Interim measure
young unemployed
A
0,
1.
2,
2,
:
.3
.3
.0
.6
A =
Β =
Β
0.5
1.6
2.6
3.2
number
number
of
of
Experimental
projects
women
A
0.2
0.3
for
Β
0.4
0.6
WVM
A
6.6
7.9
8.4
7.6
new applications (x
new appi i cations in
'79
Β
2.3
2.4
1.7
1.2
1000)
* of
TAP
A
7.5
7.4
3.8
3.7
3.0
3.1
4.0
2.1
unemp
Β
2.9
2.7
1.4
1.3
1.1
0.9
0.8
0.3
loymei
WVM '82 and
WVM-M
A
11.2
17.9
13.7
5.5
Β
3.8
3.4
2.3
1.0
it of the
target group
Sources: 1975-1984: De Wachter and Visser (1986)
1985: Annual Report Department of Labour Market Policy
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maximum of 40,000 dfl. a year if hiring an unemployed belonging to one of
the target groups for a period of 6-12 months. On the other hand, besides
WVM '82, which was directed at the non-profit sector, a WVM for the market
sector has been established. This WVM-M was experimental and had a limited
scope. The target group was formed by young people under the age of 23
and longer than 9 months unemployed. The contract-wage was fully
subsidised plus 25% as a compensation of the employer's share in social
security premiums. Motives for the revision of 1982 were a simplification of
the job creation measures and making them more efficient. For that reason
TAP and WVM '79 were linked up and the target groups of WVM '79 were
specified in detail. The way this was done reflects the priority combatting
youth unemployment was given in social policy in those days. By introducing
the experimental WVM-M the objection had been met that an insufficient
number of young unskilled unemployed, for whom no employment could be
created in the non-profit sector was reached (De Koning en Stolk, 1984;
Blomsma, 1987).
After a few years, however, ' serious doubts have arisen with regard to
the effectiveness of WVM. As total unemployment increased, the reach of WVM
relatively decreased as is clearly shown by Table 4.8. In 1983 government
stated that WVM should be applied especially in the case of LTU youth and
women in the target groups. Two years later it seemed also that these newly
set goals had not been achieved. An evaluative study revealed that WVM bad
not attained lowly skilled unemployed, that it had not been very successful
in ameliorating the labour market position of the participants and that it. had
been very expensive (De Wachter en Visser, 1986). In the case of WVM-M
there had probably been a considerable amount of substitution of regular
jobs by subsidised ones in the private sector (De Koning en Stolk, 1984).
Furthermore, a part of the target groups profited from other measures o.g,
those regarding unpaid work for persons in receipt of benefit (see section
4.3.6).
Since 1983 the budget available for WVM has been diminished and at this
moment the measure is applied only to some specific groups as women and
youth of ethnic minorities.
4.3.4 Going to long term unemployment measures
From the preceding sections the conclusion must be drawn that regular
labour market measures have been insufficient to solve the problem of
unemployment. Although no data are available, it is not likely that VLTU will
have benefitted more than average.
There are several reasons for the fall in new applications and the
ultimate abolition of PBM and WVM demonstrated by Tables 4.7 and 4.8.
Firstly also these measures have been affected by the financial policy of the
government. After all, economic recovery is the most important way to
reduce unemployment, and reduction of the public budget deficit by means of
cutting expenditure is seen as a main contribution to economic recovery.
Secondly, some common characteristics of these kind of measures are that
their implementation is often based more on a political consensus than on
economic judgements, and their effectiveness can be defined in different
ways (OECD 1982). Combination of both characteristics lead to frequent
changes in measures. Thirdly, a pure political reason is the importance for
policy-makers and politicians to demonstrate that they are actively combatting
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unemployment. Therefore it is necessary to get into the limelight by
presenting new labour market measures (cf Van Dijk et al., 1987). Some of
these new measures are discussed in the next sections.
4.3.5 Youth
Combatting youth unemployment has been given priority in social policy
since in the mid 1970s large numbers of school leavers could not find a job.
We have already mentioned the fact that with the revision of WVM young
unemployed have been designated as a special target group.
With respect to long term youth unemployment in 1984 a special scheme
has been introduced. Youth Job Placement Scheme (Jeugdontplooiingsbanen,
JOB) is actually a placement measure. JOB allows employers to place in
temporary jobs persons under the age of 25 who are officially registered as
unemployed for two years or more. Authorities subsidise 33% of wage-costs.
The young are contracted at the national employment agency, START, for one
year, during which period they can get one or more jobs. They receive the
minimum wage for youth.
The aim of the JOB-scheme is to ameliorate the labour market position of
the young VLTU firstly by setting limits to the duration of their
unemployment and secondly by allowing them to acquire work experience. An
evaluative study of the JOB-scheme was rather positive about the results.
Approximately 30% of the target group has been reached and at least half the
number of the former participants have found a job afterwards. Some
negative aspects are noticed. A considerable number of participants had
occupied a job only for one month, hardly acquiring any work experience
thatway. Females have been under represented in the group of participants,
probably because relatively many placements have taken place in
manufacturing. Another critical point is the significant displacement effect.
In 80% of the cases there had been displacement of non-subsidised workers,
in most cases to a considerable extent. Conclusion of the study is that the
JOB-scheme has ameliorated the labour market position of the participants,
but that total employment has hardly increased (De Koning et al., 1987).
4.3.6 "Plough-back" schemes
The more the number of unemployed persons receiving unemployment
benefits was growing, the more suggestions have been heard to make these
benefits more productive for society. In 1978 already the Secretary of State
for Social Affairs allowed unemployed to do unpaid work while receiving
unemployment benefits. Since that time this directive has been extended and
at this moment a law regulating unpaid work by unemployed in receipt of
benefit is in preparation. Many unemployed are making use of the possibility
offered trying to maintain their work pace and work experience, or simply to
pass their time. In 1985 their number is estimated between 36,000 and 44,000
(De Lange et al., 1986).
Also "plough-back" schemes (Terugploegexperimenten, TPE) are meant to
use unemployment benefits in a productive way and to reduce LTU.
Additional jobs are created for LTU partly financed by the unemployment
benefits saved of the re-entried unemployed ("ploughing-back"). TPE has
been introduced in 1984 in the construction industry and the educational
sector. In the construction industry additional projects valued at one billion
dfl. were expected durinng the year 1984. 250 million dfl. should be
"ploughed-back", authorities should contribute 100 million dfl., while 650
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million dfl. should come from extra investments by others. The projects were
estimated to create 8,700 man-years of extra employment.
There were some conditions for approval of the projects, the most
important being:
at least 70% of the newly created jobs had to be occupied by
persons who were unemployed for one year or more;
- the projects had to be additional, that is they should not
displace other projects nor regular employees.
Evaluative studies are rather positive about the results of TPE. In the
construction industry average costs of newly created jobs proved to be
higher than expected, and as a result the estimated number of new jobs had
not been achieved. It also seemed that in some cases substitution of regular
projects by subsidised ones had occured. With respect to the hiring of LTU,
the study notes that at the time of selection and preparation of the
TPE-project insufficient account had been taken of their qualifications and
skills. To solve the problems generated that way, construction employers
changed LTU on TPE-projects and regular workers on other projects. The
study advises a more careful selection of labour intensive projects (Van
Groesen et al., 1985).
In the educational sector conditions for TPE were slightly different. Two
categories of persons were pointed to who the scheme was applicable:
A. Personnel who would be dismissed without TPE;
B. Unemployed for one year at least under the age of 32.
As expected, the 8,400 additional jobs were created during the school
years 1984/85 and 1985/86, Of these 2,700 belonged to category A and 5,700
to category B.
School directories were content about the performance of the LTU. Some
40% of them have found a regular job after the end of the TPE-project. A
complication has arisen by a judicial judgement after a complaint of female
unemployed teachers. According to this judgement also unemployed not in
receipt of unemployment benefits are entitled to occupy jobs created by TPE
(Veerman en Bijker, 1986). Evidently, "ploughing-back" of benefits is not
possible in these cases, which can take away the attractiveness of the
measure.
The positive evaluation of TPE in the construction industry has led to a
second series of projects. A total amount of 1,275 million dfl. is concerned.
The projects are expected to create 7,100 man-years of additional
employment. After a final evaluation at the end of 1987 the government will
decide either to continue TPE in the construction industry and maybe other
areas, or to end it.
Some general remarks can be made on the applicability of TPE. In fact it
is a kind of wage subsidy and most objections against wage subsidies are
also relevant for TPE. This is true for displacement effects as well as for
interference of competition and labour market allocation. Hence, some strict
conditions must be fulfilled:
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A significant number of LTU with a narrowly defined skill or
occupation (on a local or regional level);
A foreseeable future improvement in labour market conditions
for workers in that skill of occupation;
Strictly selected additional projects, which last for a relatively
long time period, are characterised by a large amount of similar
work and have a high labour intensity.
In practice, these conditions can be met to a certain extent only. For
this reason there is no general agreement on the desirability of TPE, and a
wide-spread application is not to be expected.
4.3.7 Renewed attention for training
As has been demonstrated in section 4.2.3, VLTU's are generally poorly
qualified. There is a considerable discrepancy between the qualification
structure of the supply of VLTU and the demand for labour.
Table 4.9 Vacancies and VLTU to level of eduction (%)
Vacancies VLTU
(Jan. 1986) (March 1986)
Only basic education 6.9 49.9
Primary general and vocational education 34.0 32.1
Secondary general and voc. education 35.6 11.0
Higher education 23.5 4.1
Total (100%) 66,200 254.100
Clearly there is a shortage of vacancies for the poorly qualified VLTU.
For that reason recent policy-initiatives towards LTU pay attention to
training as well as to the duration of employment. In order to reduce youth
unemployment and to meet future needs of sufficiently experienced and
qualified labour supply, the government has introduced the Youth Employment
Guarantee Scheme (Jeugwerkgarantieplan, JWG). According to this scheme in
its original form a temporary job or training place would be offered to people
younger than 21 years who are unemployed for half a year or more.
Evidently, JWG should totally eliminate long-term youth unemployment. Also
in the long run it was expected to reduce considerably LTU among the more
than 20 year olds, because JWG-participants would relatively easily find a
regular and lasting job.
In practice, the scheme proved not to be feasible in its original form.
The basic idea behind the scheme was to replace the income-guarantee
offered by the social security system to unemployed school leavers by an
employment-guarantee. However, the government had to withdraw its
proposal to refuse social benefits to young people not accepting a JWG-job
offered to them.
Other problems were caused as the unions and the employers
-organisations raised objections against the implementation of the scheme.
Employers found it hard to create additional jobs in the private sector
without displacement effects and distortion of competition. Unions
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ended co-operation as a lasting job could not be guaranteed after the
expiration of the JWG-job.
By now JWG-jobs will be offered by the public sector. Especially the
municipalities are expected to play a major part. Training will not be offered
in separate training-places but training facilities will be offered
complementary to the JWG-jobs.
After serious doubts had arisen about the effectiveness of PBM and WVM
a new measure has been developed to stimulate the re-entry of LTU into the
work force (Maatregel Ondersteuning Arbeidsinpassing, MOA). MOA has been
introduced in 1986 and aims at people who are unemployed for more than one
year. By subsidising wage-costs (1,000 dfl. monthly, during half a year at
most) employers are encouraged to hire LTU for 6 months or more. No
unlimited duration contract is required, what is an important difference with
PBM. The employer is expected to take care of training and guidance of the
hired unemployed, MOA can be applied in the profit-sector and in the
non-profit sector. In the profit-sector LTU can be placed on already
existing jobs, while in the non-profit sector additional jobs must be created.
The number of applications MOA has steadily risen from 1,300 at the start
of the scheme in July 1986 to 6,845 in April 1987. At that moment almost 2%
of the LTU was reached.
Uncertainty exists about the future of MOA due to the existence of
another Measure for Long-Term Unemployed (Maatregel Langdurig Werklozen,
MLW). MLW is meant for persons older than 21 years who are unemployed
for more than 3 years (officially registered or not) or who have been looking
for a job for 2 years and have followed retraining courses. If an employer
appoints such a VLTU for at least 6 months he will be exempt from the
employers share of social security premiums for a period of 4 years at most.
That means a reduction of wage-costs of approximately 20%. Another,
once-only subsidy of 4,000 dfl. is endowed to employers as compensation for
training and guidance costs. Condition for this subsidy is a hiring-spell of
at least 2 years. MLW is applicable in the private sector as well as in the
public sector.
MLW has been applied for only a short period of time and a evaluation is
not yet available. Nevertheless, after some months adjustments have been
carried through. Contrary to the description above, the original scheme
provided a period of placement of at least 2 years (instead of 6 months) as a
condition to exempt premiums. Also the group VLTU following retraining
courses was excluded in the original version of MLW.
4.3.8 Concluding remarks
Since the increase in LTU a variety of measures has been originated.
During the first years these measures were characterised by a preferential
treatment of LTU in the application of the existing policy-tools. Later on
special schemes were introduced for LTU. Only very recently policy
measures with respect to VLTU have been set up.
19
86/569
Table 4. 10 Overview of unemployment schemes
Scheme
PBM
WVM '79
WVM '82
TPE
JOB
JWG
MOA
MLW
Year
1979
1979
1982
1984
1984
1986
1986
1986
1987
Age
-
< 23 years
£ 23 years
-
< 25 years
s 20 years
-
£ 21 years
Unemployment. Spell
£ 3 months
£ 6 months
£ 9 months
£ 12 months
£ 1 year
£ 2 years
£ 6 months
£ 1 year
£ 3 years
also £ 2 years + 1
year retraining.
Most recent measures include wage-costs subsidies with a
training-component.
Retraining of VLTU is considered to be an essential condition for
re-entry into work. The discrepancy in educational level between labour
demand and the supply of VLTU has been shown in Table 4.9. However, this
Table also demonstrates a large shortage of labour demand. It is clear that
measures with respect to VLTU will be effective mainly at the individual
level. Retraining and work experience may ameliorate the competitiveness of
the VLTU against other job seekers. If there are effects on total
employment, these will be small and partly indirect.
A final remark concerns the implicit presupposition of VLTU as a
homogenous group, only to be distinguished by age. Recent research shows
that among the VLTU some groups have better chances to find a job than
others and that there are groups which have no chance at all, although they
are very willing to work. A lot of factors play a role in limiting the
(re)-entry opportunities of the VLTU, such as age, educational level,
occupation, former work experience, working friends and relatives, access to
labour market information, ethniticity, and the way of looking for a job, etc.
etc. The point is that some VLTU or some groups of VLTU are affected by
more such factors than others. Thus, ten clusters of VLTU have been
distinguished (SRB, 1987). Clearly, up till now, measures with respect to
VLTU are not as differentiated as that.
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Annex 4. A
The very long term unemployed by age and sex (February 1982)
Persons (xl(
Age
<23
23-64
)00)
Male
2
27
Female
5
12
Total
7
39
15-64 29 17 46
B. % by sex
<23 32 68 100
23-64 70 30 100
15-64 65 35 100
C. % by age
<23 7 27 14
23-64 93 73 86
15-64 100 100 100
D. % of total number of unemployed in respective groups
<23 2 5 4
23-64 10 12 11
15-64 8 9 8
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Annex 4. Β
Probability of leaving the unemployment registers* within a year,
April 1985
Duration of unemployment (years)
15-24 years
25-54 years
55-64 years
<1
73
60
54
Male
1-2 2-3
49
48
42
54
34
27
>3
53
23
18
<1
67
51
59
Female
1-2 2-3
54
44
46
50
42
>3
46
29
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Rapportage
Arbeidsmarkt 1986, Table 5.2
It must be stressed that this is not the probability of finding
a job. For some 40 per cent registration is ended for other
reasons. This is about 35 per cent among the short term unemployed
(<1 year) and 50 per cent among the VLTU. Other reasons than work
are for example study or military service, (especially for the
young), illness/disability and withdrawal for other reasons. A
special category arises from pure adminsitrative reasons when
registration is ended and renewed, without changes in the labour
market position of the unemployed individual (e.g. in the case of
moving or of simply forgetting to extend the registration) .
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Chapter 5 Very Long Term Unemployment in the UK
Ρ Ν Junankar
5.1. Introduction
There has been a dramatic increase in Very Long Term Unemployment
(VLTU) since the beginning of the 1980s in the UK. From April 1981 to April
1987 VLTU increased from 219,648 to 811,412, an increase of 269%. As a
percentage of total unemployment, VLTU increased (over the same period)
from 8% to 26%. To some extent this is simply a reflection of the growth in
total unemployment from 2,525,200% to 3,107,100% (over the same period). It
is important to note that the nature of long term unemployment (LTU) or
VLTU has changed over time: in the fifties and sixties the LTU (or VLTU)
were "secondary" workers: the old, the sick, the unskilled, the uneducated.
Now they are "primary" workers: younger (youths and prime age workers,
16-24 and 25-44), often skilled workers and many educated professional
workers. The international recession, Government policy, and structural
changes in the British economy have devastated the manufacturing and
industrial sectors and left a trail of misery. in Britain's industrial heartland,
especially the West Midlands.
The plan of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 discusses some concepts
and measurement problems, Section 3 provides a description of VLTU, Section
4 discusses some explanations, Section 5 discusses various policies towards
LTU, and Section 6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Concepts and Measurement Problems
Although there is no agreed definition (or method of measuring)
unemployment, most people would agree that there has been a dramatic
increase in the past few years. It is possible to distinguish three labour
market states (for those past school-leaving age):
Employed Unemployed Not-in-the-Labour Force
Full Part Looking Not Looking Discouraged Students House- Retired
Time Time for for work Workers wives people
work
It is clear that those people who are employed full time are not
unemployed, but some of the people who are employed part-time may prefer
to work full time so that in fact they are partially unemployed (or
under-employed). Of those people who are unemployed, most may be looking
for work, but a minority may not be looking for work (either because they
do not expect to find work, or because they are not really interested in
finding work). Of the 'not-in-the labour force' category, there may be a
group who are "discouraged workers": those people who have given up hope
of finding work (some of them may have become full-time housewives or
"encouraged students"). Unemployment in the UK has been traditionally
measured by an administrative process. Up to 1982 those people who
registered at an unemployment office (and hence demonstrated their
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willingness to work and search for work) were counted as ("registered")
unemployed. Since 1982, only those people who were claiming benefits("claimants") have been included. This move excluded several people
(especially married women) who were ineligible to claim benefits.
In recent years a fourth labour market state has made a significant
impact:
(Government) Special Employment Measures
These include the Youth Training Schemes (YTS), Community Programme,
Enterprise Allowance Scheme, etc. People on these schemes are not formally
employed or unemployed, although in response to questionnaires they may
claim to be employed or unemployed.
Besides the measure of unemployment based on registration or claimants
basis, there is now an annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) which provides
estimates based on asking respondents their labour market status. This
provides a measure based on "availability" and "looking for work". If the
respondent is not employed, available for work, and looking for work in the
past week then (s)he is counted as unemployed. But for various reasons an
unemployed person may not have looked for work in the past week, so in
recent years the sample are asked if they looked for work in the past four
weeks. These LFS estimates provide an interesting alternative source:
comparisons are provided in Lhe Employment Gazette (June 1983, August 1984,
October 1985, October 1986 and April 1987).
A Schematic Presentation of Unemployment Flows
( inflows \ QOutflows
Employment
Government
Schemes
Discouraged
Workers
( Outflows J 	 > Illness
Retires/
Early Retires
It is important to note that the labour market is continually changing
with people moving between the different states. In particular, unemployment
is a stock with inflows (consisting of new entrants, voluntary quits and
involuntary separations - redundancies, dismissals, etc) and outflows (new
hires, people leaving due to illness, old age, or discouraged workers, as well
as those joining Government schemes, e.g. YTS, etc.) This is presented
	
¤6/569
schematically in Diagram 5.1. Although, it is a simplification, the short term
unemployed have a greater probability of "escaping" from unemployment into
employment or Government schemes. The long-term unemployed or very
long-term unemployed (LTU or VLTU) have a smaller probability of 'escaping'
and are more likely to give up (discouraged workers), fall ill, or take up
early retirement. It is possible to imagine the unemployment stock as a big
tank of water with a net about one-third from the bottom: those who fall
through the net remain for a long time while those who do not fall through
the net (the more skilled, better qualified etc) manage to leave (outflow) from
the unemployment stock. The size of the unemployment stock (the tank of
water) has clearly increased over the past few years but so has the level of
the "net".
Once we look at the dynamics of unemployment we need to distingxiish
between an interrupted spell of unemployment and a completed spell. If we
look at the unemployment stock we get a snap-shot at an instant in time:
the people who are unemployed at that point in time may remain unemployed
for (say) another year. To look at unemployment durations of the
unemployment stock may give us some information, but we need to know how
many of the presently short term unemployed will (eventually) become LTU or
VLTU. A simple diagram illustrates this problem:
Interrupted and Completed Duration Spells
Diagram 5.2
I 	 | 	 1 	 | 	 | 	 1 	 1 	 »
1986 (2) (3) 4 1987 2 3
(1) (1)
If we measure unemployment in 1987(2) we are more likely to sample the
longer durations (length bias) but also measure an interrupted spell (t is lhe
unemployment spell and s the completed spell) and hence have an
interruption bias, (see Salant (1977). This leads to the result that at the
onset of a recession the proportion of LTU or VLTU in total unemployment
falls and only after a period of time the proportion rises.
A particular problem with measurement of LTU or VLTU in Britain is that
if an unemployed person falls ill (s)he comes off the claimants register and
the unemployment duration is terminated. In getting well again the person
re-joins the unemployment stock but as a new person with a zero duration of
unemployment. As LTU and VLTU are more likely to be ill this is likely to
provide a downward bias to the numbers. Similarly, if a VLTU person joins
some Government scheme (e.g.. Community Programme) and then fails to find
regular employment and joins the unemployment stock, (s)he is treated as a
person with a zero unemployment duration. Finally, some people may have
recurrent spells of unemployment (and hence suffer as much as the VLTU)
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but little information is available for this group (but see Disney (1979),
Moylan, Millar and Davies (1984)).
To summarise, measured LTU or VLTU may be an underestimate because
of (a) interrupted spells, (b) illness terminating a spell, (c) recurrent spells,
(d) joining special employment measures, and (e) early retirement.
Comparisons over time using data from the Department of Employment is
very difficult and misleading because of a series of changes made in the
method of measuring unemployment, see Unemployment Unit Briefing No 10
(March 1986), Charter for Jobs Vol. 2, No. 7, May 1987, Employment Gazetle
October 1986 p. 422. Both the old registration method and the new claimants
measure under-records female unemployment and a fortiori LTU and VLTU.
5.3. The Growth of VLTU: Trends and Characteristics
Let us first look at the trends in VLTU in recent years. As mentioned
earlier, the time series data on unemployment are now based on an
administrative count of those people who are claiming benefits. Due to
various administrative changes since 1979 the numbers counted as
unemployed have been lowered and as such comparisons over time are
midleading. However, inspite of these "statistical" changes, there has been a
significant increase in VLTU for both males and females. Tables 5.1 and 5.2
present a summary picture of the growth of VLTU by age for males and
females respectively. For males VLTU increased from 180,960 in 1981 to
643,002 in 1987: from 9.9% of total male unemployment to 29.8%. For females
VLTU increased from 38,688 to 168,410 (over the same period): from 5.5% of
total female unemployment to 17.8%. This growth, as mentioned earlier, is in
fact an under-estimate of the real growth in VLTU. (There appears to be a
slight fall in VLTU in 1987).
(i) Age and Sex Distribution
A look at the trends in VLTU for different age groups (Tables 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3 and Diagrams 5,3 and 5.4) is revealing. For males an interesting
shift has taken place over time: the proportion of the prime age group
(25-44) in total VLTU has displaced the older workers (45-64) (see the
columns labelled "c"). Even young people (16-24) have increased their
representation in total VLTU (this is even though 16-18 year olds cannot be
unemployed for more than 2 years and a large number of them are in the
Youth Training Scheme).
In 1981, 58% of total VLTU males were 45 years or older, while in 1987
only 38% were 45 years or older. The fastest growth in VLTU was for the
16-24 age group. In any case for each age group there is an increase in
VLTU in absolute numbers as well as in the share in total unemployment of
the respective age groups.
The labour market for females has been relatively buoyant, but
nonetheless there has been a continuing growth in unemployment and VLTU
(except in 1987). However, the data on females based on a "claimant" basis
are particularly suspect. This is because unemployment benefits are paid out
for upto twelve months to people who have worked for an appropriate length
of time prior to becoming unemployed. After this twelve month period,
unemployed persons are eligible for discretionary supplementary allowances.
These are paid taking account of family incomes and resources: hence a
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married woman with an employed husband is unlikely to be eligible for
supplementary allowances and hence will not be counted as unemployed. We
would, therefore, expect VLTU to be seriously underestimated for married
women. Notwithstanding this problem, VLTU has increased for all age groups
(Table 5.2) although the proportions of total VLTU for different age groups
are remarkably stable (columns "c"). For females, VLTU appears to be a
greater problem the older they get.
The seriousness of the problem of VLTU is more clearly seen in Table
5.4. In 1987 27 per cent of unemployed males and 13 per cent of unemployed
females had been unemployed for more than four years. It is difficult to
appreciate the impact on these people in terms of demoralisation, and on their
physical and mental health etc, see Harrison (1976), Junankar (1986).
Table 5.3 provides an alternative way of looking at VLTU by providing a
measure of the VLTU rate: the numbers who are VLTU divided by the
working population of the appropriate age/sex group. The decline in VLTU
rates for males aged 60 and over is clearly a reflection of the early
retirement policy encouraged by the Government. This again shows the
growth in VLTU rates for prime age males. VLTU is no longer a problem
only for the old (or the infirm). In 1987 we note that males between 25 and
34 had a VLTU rate higher than the overall rate (while in 1981 it was below
the overall rate).
(ii) Regional Distribution
Table 5.5 and Diagram 5.2 provide a regional dimension to the VLTU
problem. The table provides unemployment rates and VLTU rates for 1981
and 1987. Unfortunately, since 1986 the Department of Employment includes
self-employed people and Armed Forces & employees in the working
population when they were previously excluded. Thus the figures for 1981
and 1987 are not really comparable. However, it is clear that regions with
high unemployment rates also have high VLTU rates. A simple ordinary least
squares regression of the log of male VLTU rate on log of male unemployment
rates (using this cross-section of regional rates) gave the following results:
Log Male VLTU Rate (1987) = -2.493 + 1.485 Log Male Unemployment Rate (1987)
(-10.602) (16.638)
Ra = 0.96 η = 12.
Log Male VLTU Rate (1981) = -4.949 + 2.022 Log Male Unemployment Rate (1981)
(-14.608) (15.490)
Ra = 0.96 η = 12.
This suggests that a one per cent increase in the male unemployment
rate in 1987 (1981) increased the VLTU Rate by 1.485 in 1987 (2.022 in 1981).
There is a more than proportionate increase in the VLTU Rate: a
redistribution of aggregate demand over regions would lower the VLTU Rates.
The regional distribution of VLTU rates emphasises the North-South
divide (which reflects the general problem of unemployment): the decline of
the manufacturing sector has hit the Northern regions.
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Diagram 5.3: Very Long Term Unemployment By Age: Males
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Table 5.1
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 .
1986
1987
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Very Long Term
VLTU (000s)
(a)
16,118
41,516
78,324
103,021
118,340
110,552
90,556
VLTU (000s)
(a)
57,969
106,631
180,425
244,010
292,368
317,227
309,027
VLTU (000s)
(a)
105,516
125,484
191,006
188,869
222,469
243,447
243,419
Unemployment in UK
16-24
(Males)
VLTU/Unemployment
w
(b)
2.85
6.07
10.52
14.20
15.71
15.12
14.16
25-44
VLTU/Unemployment
(*)(b)
8.43
13.24
21.43
28.65
32.17
34.00
34.19
45-64
VLTU/Unemployment
(*)(b)
18.70
18.76
26.60
31.35
36.58
38.89
39.59
Share of VLTU
.'Ο/λ
(c)
8.91
15.07
17.38
19.22
18.68
16.47
14.08
Share of VLTU
(c)
32.03
38.71
40.03
45.51
46.16
47.26
48.06
Share of <:T.TU
'O.-N
'..< ".
58. P.l
45 . 55
42 . 38
35 . 23
35.12
36.27
37.86
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Table 5.1
VLTU Total
180,960
275,482
450,727
536,108
633,385
671,206
643,002
continued
Total Male
Unemployment
1,819,757
2,161,954
2,207,516
2,180,060
2,270,721
2,290,027
2,158,222
VLTU/Unemp 1 oyme η t
(*)
9.94
12.74
20.42
24.59
27.89
29.30
29.79
10
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Table 5.1 continued
Source: Employment Gazettes (various)
(a) Numbers (000s) unemployed for 2 years or more in April of each year
(b) Very long term unemployed as a percentage of total unemployment of that
age group
(c) Very long term unemployed in age group (i) = Share of VLTU
Σ very long term unemployed in age group (i)
11
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Table 5.2
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Very Long Term
VLTU (000s)
(a)
8,548
18,180
25,371
31,274
50,554
49,080
41,268
VLTU (000s)
(a)
10,986
19,632
19,259
30,725
41,649
49,970
48,745
VLTU (000s)
(a)
18,602
24,480
31,465
49,060
63,593
74,178
77,306
Unemployment UK (Females)
16-24
VLTU/Unemployment
(*)(b)
2.43
4.32
5.67
6.87
10.98
10.84
10.68
25-44
VLTU/Unemployment
w
(b)
4.69
7.00
7.21
10.04
11.74
13.07
13.42
44-59
VLTU/Unemp 1 oyraent
(*)
(b)
15.91
17.13
21.19
29.52
34.25
37.29
39.06
Share of VLTU
(*)
(c)
22.09
28.83
33.12
26.13
32.26
28.21
24.50
Share of VLTU
m
(c)
28.40
31.13
25.14
25 . 68
26.58
28.72
28.94
Share of VLTU
(*)(c)
48.08
38.82
41.07
40.99
40.58
42.64
45.90
Table 5.2 continued
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Table 5.2 continued
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Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
VLTU Total
38,688
63,060
76,610
119,660
156,701
173,962
168,410
Total Unemployment
(Females)
705,457
845,842
841,563
927,622
1,001,844
1,035,031
948,906
VLTU/Unemp 1 oymen t
(*)
5.48
7.46
9.10
12.90
15.64
16.81
17.75
Source: Employment Gazettes (various)
(a) Numbers (000s) unemployed for 2 years or more in April of each year
(b) Very long term unemployed as a percentage of total unemployment of that
age group
(c) Very long term unemployed in age group (i) = Share of VLTU
Σ very long term unemployed in age group (i)
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Table 5.3 Very Long Term Unemployment Rates by Age: UK
April 1981 April 1987
Male Female Male Female
Age
18-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-59
> 60
All Ages
0.2
0.8
0.8
1.0
1.4
1.9
3.9
1.3
Source: Employment Gazette,
Notes VLTU Rate VLTU(000¡
May,
s)
0.2
0.5
0.3
.0.2
0.5
1.0
0.1
0.4
Oct.. 1981 and
X
1.4
3.5
4.1
3.8
4.5
8.1
0.9
3.9
June,
100
September
1.2
1.9
1.1
0.8
1.9
4.4
0.2
1.5
198'
86/569
Working Population (000s)
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Table 5.4 Unemployment Durations: UK
Males
Percentage of Unem¬
ployed with Duration
1981
12 months
24 months
36 months
48 months
60 months
22
10
6
n.a
n.a
1987 1981
46
30
22
16
11
16
6
3
n.a
n.a
Females
1987
18
12
8
Source: Unemployment. Unit Statistical Supplement June/July 1987.
Notes: 1.
2.
Data are for April
n.a. = not available.
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(iii) Inflows and Outflows
As mentioned earlier (see Diagram 5.1) we can analyse unemployment in
terms of the inflows into the unemployment stock and the outflows from the
unemployment stock. In fact, in analysing the labour market we would like
to know the origin of the inflows (new entrants, voluntary quits,
redundancies, dismissals etc) and the destination of the outflows (employment,
Government schemes, retires, etc). However, British time series data does not
provide this kind of information. However, we do have information on
uncompleted and completed durations and can thus obtain estimates of the
probability of leaving unemployment for individuals with different periods of
unemployment to date. This evidence suggests that the labour market
operates on a last-in-first out (LIFO) basis, whether it is from the
employment stock or the unemployment stock. (According to usual industrial
relations procedures employers normally dismiss the newest employee except
when they are providing redundancy to get rid of older workers). There is
much evidence to suggest that the probability of leaving the unemployment
stock decreases with the length of the duration experienced.
A recent article in the Employment Gazette (September 1986, pp. 358-364)
discusses various aspects of the dynamics of unemployment with the large
numbers of people flowing in and out of the unemployment stock. Most of
the people joining the unemployment stock leave unemployment very quickly
(25% within 4 weeks, 50% within 3 months, and 66% within six months).
However, from each cohort that joins the unemployment stock, some (about
20%) sink into long term unemployment. Table 5.6 provides a look at Lhe
probability of reaching VLTU for those who have currently reached different
unemployment durations. For example, for males and females, 7% of the new
inflow will enter 2 years duration. Going down column 2 we can see the
longer the current duration the greater the probability of entering VLTU.
The age/sex breakdown also shows that older people are more likely to enter
VLTU than younger people and males more likely than females. The
difference between males and females may simply be a reflection of the social
security system of paying unemployment benefits for only one year, followed
by discretionary supplementary benefits. As mentioned earlier, these
estimates must be treated as under-estimates because of the outflows into
early retirement, Government schemes, leaving the labour force (discouraged
workers) etc.
(iv) Characteristics of VLTU
There are no studies known to us of the VLTU that give an account of
their characteristics. The best known study, White (1983) looks at long term
unemployment (duration greater than one year) which can be used to give
some point of comparison with our results from the Labour Force Survey,
1984. The White (1983) study done for the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) was
a stratified sample of those who had been continuously unemployed for one
year or more in June 1980. Since that time the economy has gone through
one of the deepest and longest recessions so that more recent results may be
different from the PSI study.
16
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Table 5.5 Unemployment Rates by Regions: UK
Unemployment Rate {%) Very Long Term Unemploy¬
ment Rate {%)
South East
Greater
London
East Anglia
South West
West
Midlands
East
Midlands
Yorkshire &
Humberside
North West
North
Wales
Scotland
N. Ireland
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Source: Employment
Not ρ : VT.TTT
Ap;
Gazett'
ril 1981 Ap
9.2
4.5
8.8
4.3
10.7
5.4
11.4
6.6
14.8
8.6
11.7
6.2
13.5
7.4
15.2
8.8
16.4
9.5
16.0
10.1
15.0
9.7
21.2
11.6
e, May 1981,
r VLTU (000s)
ril 1987
9.2
6.1
10.3
6.6
9.3
7.3
10.1
8.0
14.3 .
9.5
11.7
8.0
15.1
9.2
17.0
9.9
19.0
10.3
15.8
10.1
17.4
10.8
22.4
12.6
June and
	 ν 1
April 1981 Apr
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.8
0.3
1.1
0.4
1.3
0.1
1.1
0.3
1.3
0.4
1.9
0.5
2.2
0.6
1.7
0.6
1.8
0.6
3.6
0.7
September 1987.
inn
il 1987
2.3
1.0
2.8
1.2
2.2
1.1
2.3
1.2
5.1
2.0
3.3
1.3
4.5
1.6
5.8
2.0
6.3
2.1
4.7
1.7
5.0
1.8
8.9
2.4
Working Population (000s)
where VLTU are those unemployed for £ 2 years.
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Diagram 5.5
Regional Very Long Term Unemployment Rates for Males, April 1987.
Source: Table 5.5
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In the PSI sample 58% of the male LTU and 45% of the female LTU were
over 45 years old. In general they had lower educational qualifications and
about 50% were previously unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Most of the
LTU had been working immediately prior to becoming unemployed (85% of the
male LTU and 77% of the female LTU). 51% of males and 41% of female LTU
were made redundant or were dismissed, and 38% and 50% respectively left
voluntarily (see White Table III.8). An important finding of this study was
that there was downward mobility (or downgrading prior to the present spell
of LTU), i.e. people had held skilled or non-manual jobs then after spells of
unemployment taken unskilled jobs before finally becoming LTU. The LTU
also had a high proportion of people with disabilities and a greater
proportion of illness. White suggests that illness may be partly a cause and
partly a consequence of unemployment.
The general findings were that the LTU had come mainly from the
manufacturing sector, that the LTU had been through recurrent spells of
unemployment, occupational downgrading until eventually falling into a trap
of LTU.
Let us now turn to the results from the Labour Force Survey, 1984.
The LFS results are usually different from the administrative count
(Department of Employment, DE, statistics) and have been compared in various
articles in the Employment Gazette. In particular, women are more likely to
be counted as unemployed in the LFS method than in the DE method. In the
LFS 1984, 62.2% of the unemployed people were males and 37.8% females. 45%
of males and 63% of females were short-term unemployed (<1 year), 17% males
and 16% females were unemployed for between 1 and 2 years, and 37% of
males and 21% of females were unemployed for 2 or more years.
Table 5.7 and 5.8 show that for males and females the highest proportion
of all the unemployed, and of all the VLTU, came from the prime-age group,
25-44 years. For males (females), almost three-quarters of the VLTU were
under 45 years of age. This contrasts with the PSI study where a majority
of the LTU were over 45.
A majority of the male VLTU were married, came from large adult
households, and lived in rented property. All but 8% of male VLTU claimed
unemployment benefits, while 45% of female VLTU claimed no unemployment
benefits. Of the unemployed males 60% had no qualifications, and 74% of male
VLTU had no qualifications. For females 48% of the unemployed and 62% of
the VLTU had no qualifications. A large majority (79%) of the unemployed
males (who had left their job less than 3 years before) had left them either
because of redundancy or because the contract had terminated.
A look at the class composition of the unemployed (Tables 5.9 and 5.10)
shows that a majority of the unemployed and of the VLTU came from the
unskilled, partly skilled, and manual skilled groups. The unemployment rates
for blacks is almost double that for whites but the absolute numbers in the
sample for VLTU are too small to derive any firm conclusions. (See
Employment Gazette, December 1985, pp. 467-477).
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Table 5.6
Duration Al
Reached
Inflow
3 months
6 months
9 months
12 months
15 months
18 months
2 years
Inflow
3 months
6 months
9 months
12 months
15 months
18 months
2 years
Probability
- Jan
Durât
1
ready
. 1986,
ion to
3yrs
^ales &
4
8
12
17
22
33
42
61
of Reaching Particular Duration Thresholds,
GB (%).
reach:
2yrs
Females
7
13
20
27
36
55
70
3yrs 2yrs
Males & Females Under
25 years
1
3
6
9
13
20
27
44
3
8
13
19
29
44
60
Source: Employment Gazette, September
3yrs
Males
5
10
14
21
26
36
45
62
2yrs
all ages
8
15
23
33
41
58
72
3yrs
Females
3
5
8
11
15
27
36
56
3yrs 2yrs
Males & Females 25 years
and Over
1986,
7
12
16
21
27
41
50
68
Table 1,
10
17
24
32
40
61
74
p. 361
Jan. 1985
2yrs
all ages
5
9
14
19
27
18
<- ¡
20
Table 5.7 Age and Duration: Males
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Count
Row *
Column %
Total *
Male age
16-19
20-24
25-44
45-59
60-64
Column
Total
1
< 12
539
63.3
23.2
10.3
464
43.2
19.9
8.9
850
40.6
36.5
16.2
378
38.4
16.2
7.2
96
41.6
4.1
1.8
2327
44.4
Time
1-2 years
161
18.9
17.5
3.1
187
17.4
20.3
3.6
361
17.2
39.2
6.9
176
17.9
19.1
3.4
36
15.6
3.9
0.7
921
17.6
£ 2 years
151
17.7
7.6
2.9
424
39.4
21.3
8.1
884
42.2
44.4
16.9
431
43.8
21.7
8.2
99
42.9
5.0
1.9
1989
38.0
Row
Total
851
16.2
1075
20.5
2095
40.0
985
18.8
231
4.4
5237
100.0
Xa(8) = 198.3
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Table 5.8 Age and Duration: Females
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Count X 1
Row % 1
Column %
Total % 1
Female Age 1
16-19
20-24
25-44
45-59
Column
Total
< 12
415
67.4
20.9
13.2
383
62.3
19.3
12.1
925
65.5
46.6
29.3
260
50.8
13.1
8.2
1 1983
1 62.9
Time
1-2 years
122
19.8
23.8
3.9
102
16.6
. 19.9
3.2
211
14.9
41.1
6.7
78
15.2
15.2
2.5
513
16.3
> 2 years
79
12.8
12.0
2.5
130
21.1
19.7
4.1
276
19.5
41.9
8.7
174
34.0
26.4
5.5
659
20.9
Row
Total
616
19.5
615
19.5
1412
44.8
512
16.2
3155
x2(6) = 84.6
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Table 5.9 Social Class and Duration: Males
Count %
Row %
Column %
Total %
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Column
Total
I
II
IHN
HTM
IV
V
< 12
53
66.3
2.4
1.4
350
63.8
16.0
9.1
191
60.3
8.7
4.9
946
57.5
43.3
24.5
432
53.3
19.8
11.2
213
46.5
9.7
5.5
2185
56.6
Time
1-2 years
14
17.5
1.7
0.4
110
20.0
13.3
2.9
70
22.1
8.5'
1.8
346
21.0
41.8
9.0
185
22.8
22.3
4.8
103
22.5
12.4
2.7
828
21.5
> 2 years
13
16.3
1.5
0.3
89
16.2
10.5
2.3
56
17.7
6.6
1.5
352
21.4
41.6
9.1
194
23.9
22.9
5.0
142
31.0
16.8
3.7
846
21.9
Row
Total
80
2.1
549
14.2
317
8.2
1644
42.6
811
21.0
458
11.9
3859
100.0
X2 (10) = 50.2
Notes: The social class is
Social Class I:
Social Class II:
Social Class IHN:
Social Class HIM:
Social Class IV:
Social Class V:
that of the head of household.
Professional Occupations
Intermedaite Occupations
Skilled, not manual
Skilled: manual
Partly skilled
Unskilled.
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Table 5.10 Social Class and Duration: Females
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Count X
Row X
Column X
Total X
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Social Class
Column
Total
I
II
IHN
HIM
IV
V
1 < 12
1 86
1 74.8
1 4.7
1 3.2
349
73.6
18.9
13.1
239
68.9
13.0
8.9
702
70.1
38.0
26.3
355
64.8
19.2
13.3
114
60.3
6.2
4.3
1845
69.0
Time
1-2 years
17
14.8
3.9
0.6
78
16.5
18.0
2.9
62
17.9
14.3'
2.3
140
14.0
32.3
5.2
103
18.8
23.8
3.9
33
17.5
7.6
1.2
433
16.2
> 2 years
12
10.4
3.0
0.4
47
9.9
11.9
1.8
46
13.3
11.6
1.7
159
15.9
40.2
5.9
90
16.4
22.7
3.4
42
22.2
10.6
1.6
396
14.8
Row
Total
115
4.3
474
17.7
347
13.0
1001
37.4
548
20.5
189
7.1
2674
100.0
X2(10) - 30.4
Notes: The social class is
Social Class I:
Social Class II:
Social Class IHN:
Social Class HIM:
Social Class IV:
Social Class V:
that of the head of household.
Professional Occupations
Intermedaite Occupations
Skilled, not manual
Skilled: manual
Partly skilled
Unskilled.
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5.4. Explanations
The causes of the increase in VLTU are to be found in the causes of the
growth in unemployment. In general, VLTU follows the same path as
unemployment, with a lag. Earlier studies, OECD (1983), MSC(1982) have
demonstrated the fairly close relationship between LTU and unemployment.
In our study using quarterly data for UK, (see Appendix) we find that VLTU
(whether the level or proportion) can be "explained" by lagged
unemployment. However, this is a superficial explanation of VLTU.
There are two alternative ways of analysing VLTU:
(i) Cross-section analysis
(ii) Time series analysis.
(i) ' Cross-section This method involves using individual level dala
(preferably longitudinal) to estimate "hazard" functions: the possibility of
leaving the unemployment stock. Pioneering studies in this genre are by-
Lancaster (1979), Nickell (1979) and Chesher and Lancaster (1983). The
models "explain" duration in terms of various characteristics of the
unemployed individuals: age, qualification, skills, etc. They also attempi, to
see if there is "state dependence" (or duration dependence) - whether the
length of the unemployment spell itself affects the probability of leaving· t.5v
unemployment stock. Although there are several technical problems irr-.il··;;.:!,
a consensus view would be that the longer an individual has been
unemployed (other things being equal) the lower the probability of finding
work. (Last-in-first-out from unemployment). This could be for one of two
reasons: firstly, the unemployed person gets demoralised and searches less
intensively, and secondly, the potential employer uses the unemployment
duration of the individual as a "signal" of some poor characteristic. Of
course, both these reasons may operate simultaneously. In terms of the
stock of unemployment, over time the proportion of people with the least.
"marketable qualities" will increase, see Budd, Levine and Smith (1987). The
aggregative data based on flows, see Table above, supports the view thai the
probability of leaving unemployment decreases with duration.
(ii) Time- series This analysis may be based on looking at VLTU stocks,
proportion of VLTU in total unemployment, or outflows from the unemployment
stock. One of the most comprehensive studies done on LTU is for Australia
by Trivedi and Hui (1987) where they estimate transition probabilities, and
the proportion of LTU. They explain the latter in terms of earnings,
unemployment benefits, vacancy rates, lagged unemployment, and lagged
inflow rates. Some recent studies for Britain by Budd, Levine and Smith
(1987) and Pissarides (1987) provide interesting attempts at explaining LTU.
Pissarides (1987) in his provisional paper has a model to explain the
differences between the outflow rate for short term and long term
unemployment in terms of replacement rates, vacancy rates and
unbemployment rates. He finds that the persistence in the unemployment
rate is due to the decline in the rate at which workers of all durations leave
unemployment.
The evidence we presented in the previous section suggests that the
growth in VLTU is regionally concentrated: it is in those regions which have
had structural change in terms óf a decline of the industrial sector. Unlike
the earlier period people who are VLTU now are younger, more of them have
some skills and qualifications. The big growth in VLTU, many of whom held
long term jobs before becoming unemployed themselves. The growth of VLTU
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is primarily due to a fall in aggregate demand and a decline of the industrial
sector. In addition, most of the new jobs created have been part-time in
the service sector for skilled workers. Many of the VLTU who are male and
unskilled have lost their jobs from the industrial sector and are therefore
unable to 'escape' from the trap. The older they are the more difficult it is
to escape.
5.5. Policies
In this section we shall first outline the policies introduced by the
British Government to tackle the problem of growing LTU and then evaluate
their success.
Since 1986 the Government introduced an integrated approach designed
to help the LTU. The comprehensive package brought together various
existing schemes and introduced new initiatives in a package called Action for
Jobs. Of the £3,000 million spent on various special employment measures in
1986/87, over half the sum was devoted towards the LTU problem. These
policies have been met with some scepticism by various pressure groups who
act on behalf of the unemployed: thus the Unemployment Unit and Charter
for Jobs (to name a couple of groups) have accused the Government of
attempting to affect the unemployment count rather than the problem of
unemployment and LTU.
The new scheme begins with "Restart" and includes "Job Clubs", "Job
Training Schemes", "Community Programmes", "Enterprise Allowance Schemes"
and "Jobstart".
(i) Restart This plan was announced in the Autumn of 1985 and a pilot,
scheme launched in January 1986 and extended nationally in July 1986. The
object of Restart is to provide counselling to the LTU (for those over 18
years of age who have been unemployed for a year or more): the LTU are
invited to an interview where various alternatives are discussed. Since April
1987 the scheme was extended to those with durations of six months or more
and at six monthly intervals thereafter for those remaining unemployed.
However, those who do not respond to this "invitation" are refused
unemployment benefit. Once interviewed, the unemployed may lose their right
to benefit if they refuse the alternatives offered to them (see below) by the
counsellors. As there was simultaneously a tightening of the "availability for
work" test for benefit recipients this measure has been severely criticised.
It should be noted that for some of the LTU or VLTU an interview may be
daunting and frightening, but for others it may be the first time someone
has shown an interest in their future. However, the Unemployment Unit
argues that these interviews are aimed at persuading the unemployed to
lower their wage expectations, accept less skilled jobs, or accept poorly paid
part-time work. The counsellors at the Restart interview provide the
unemployed person with a menu of choices which include*.
(ii) Job Clubs These are meant to motivate the LTU to apply for jobs
and to help with free stationery, telephones, photocopying, postage, etc.
First introduced in 1984, they have been expanded to 1,000. These have
been very successful with a high proportion (about 60%) finding employment
(as always the longer the unemployment duration the lower the probability of
finding work). As yet these operate on a small scale so that the entrants
into job clubs may be a self-selected (highly motivated) group.
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(iii) Job Training Scheme First introduced in January 1987 it was
extended to a national level on 1st April 1987. This is aimed at providing
training for 18-25 year old LTU people. The training (which lasts for six
months) is towards a recognised qualification. There are rumours that
refusal to join this scheme will make young people ineligible for benefits, and
by definition no longer unemployed. In addition those who leave the scheme
would be counted as "new entrants" into the unemployed stock. This would
obviously affect the count of LTU and VLTU.
(iv) Community Programme (CP) This was introduced in 1982 to
supersede the Community Enterprise Programme. Eligibility was dependent on
age and duration of unemployment: the 18-24 age group were eligible after
six months duration and the rest after twelve months duration. Unemployed
persons would be employed on projects of benefit to the community (mainly
environmental projects) for up to twelve months at the "local rate for the
job". The intention was to re-integrate LTU persons into the labour market.
It was hoped to have up to 300,000 employed on these schemes in 1987. By
February 1986 approximately half a million of the LTU (mainly under 25 years
of age) had joined the CP (over the years) and a large number re-entered
unemployment on leaving the CP. The idea behind CP is certainly worthwhile
and further changes should include training for the entrants. In addition,
the CP could be expanded from the simple projects to important activities like
construction (housebuilding, road building, etc).
(v) Enterprise Allowance Scheme This was introduced as a pilot
scheme in 1982 and extended nationally in 1983. The scheme pays an
allowance of £40 per week for upto a year to those people who have a £1,000
to set up a new business. As with many small businesses there is a high
rate of bankruptcies. In addition there is an element of 'deadweight' (firms
that would have been set up anyway) and displacement of existing
employment. The hope of this scheme is to foster self-employment and a
"free market economy" culture.
(vi) Jobstart Allowance LTU people are offered an allowance of £20
per week to those accepting jobs at less than £80 per week. The allowance
is paid for up to six months to encourage the LTU to accept low paid jobs
and obtain some work experience.
(vii) Job Release Scheme This scheme is to encourage older workers
to take early retirement so that they can be replaced by an unemployed
person (not just LTU). The scheme was introduced in 1977 and revised in
1984 and essentially encourages men aged 64 and women aged 59 and all
disabled men over 60 to take early retirement.
(viii) Early Retirement Schemes for LTU In November 1981 and March
1983 men over 60 were given higher supplementary allowances and
encouraged to leave the working population. This is, of course, simply a
redefinition of the LTU and not really a measure to help the LTU.
In evaluating the impact of these special employment measures to tackle
the problem of LTU or VLTU we need to consider:*
(a) deadweight loss: the number of jobs which are being subsidised which
would have been created independently of the subsidy.
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(b) substitution effect: the extent to which the VLTU are employed at (say)
the expense of the LTU. In other words, the employment measures succeed
in helping the target group at the expense of the rest.
(c) displacement effect: the employers receiving subsidies hire from the
target group but other employers are forced to shed labour because of
competition from the subsidised firms.
(d) registration rate effects: those not in the labour force remaining in the
labour force to benefit from the special employment measures. In recent
years, many may leave the labour force because of the Special Employment
Measures (e.g. Restart).
Not surprisingly the Government announces and publishes statistics
which are highly favourable to their efforts while the "unemployment lobby"
is critical of them. In a comprehensive and critical review, the Unemployment
Unit (1987) in Half Measures: A Review of MSC Special Employment and
Training Programmes argues that the net impact in terms of job creation is
fairly small although it has a significant impact on the unemployment count.
In particular they argue that the outflow from unemployment due to Restart
was no greater than the average outflows for LTU before the policy was
introduced.
The numbers involved in these schemes are fairly large as seen below in
Table 5.11.
Table 5. 11 Special Employment Measures
March 1987
Community Programme 244,000
Enterprise Allowance Scheme 81,000
Youth Training Scheme 318,219
New/Young Workers Scheme 34,103
Community Industry 8,000
Job Release Scheme 24,000
Job Splitting Scheme 297
Job Training Scheme 2,131
Jobstart Allowance Scheme 5,692
Total 717,442
Register Effect Totals 538,957
Register Effect less YTS 298,383
Source: Unemployment Unit Statistical Supplement, May 1987.
See the Institute for Manpower Studies submission of evidence to the
House of Commons Employment Committee 1985/86; and MSC Review, 1981.
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Overall there are approximately 400,000 people on various schemes
(excluding the Youth Training Scheme) which lowers the unemployment count
by about 300,000. A proper evaluation of these schemes would require a
detailed longitudinal sample of all the unemployed (including those on these
schemes) and study the longer run impact on employment experience of these
people. It is often the case that the LTU are removed from unemployment
temporarily and then return to unemployment. It is not clear whether this
temporary relief helps the individual or whether the subsequent spell of
unemployment causes even more stress.
Most of the special employment measures would be much more beneficial
in a buoyant labour market: a concerted expansion of the economy would
initially favour the short-term unemployed while the special employment
measures could help the LTU and VLTU.
5.6. Conclusions
There has been a very large increase in VLTU in the UK and this
chapter has reviewed some of the evidence on trends and characteristics of
the VLTU. Various policies towards the LTU were discussed. It was
suggested that these policies would be more successful in the context of an
expanding economy with increasing aggregate demand. Given the regional
concentration of VLTU (as of unemployment) regional employment policies
would have the greater impact on the problem.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
Using quarterly date for UK from 1979 (1) to 1986 (4) we carried out a
simple regression analysis to explain VLTU. We regressed the VLTU (total)
on the unemployment rate lagged upto eight quarters and including a lagged
dependent variable. After carrying out tests of zeo restrictions on various
lags, the best equations are presented in Table 5.A1. Equations 2 and 5 were
the preferred equations using a non-nested test.
30
86/569
Table 5. Al:
Dependent
Variable
Total LTU
Proportion
of LTU in
Unemploy¬
ment
Regressions Analysis of VLTU (1979
Eq.No
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
Constant.
-48354.2
(-.870)
-23826.4
(-1.951)
30360.1
(1.556)
-.019
(-1.053)
-.012
(-3.536)
.005
(1.003)
R2
.99
.99
.99
.99
.99
.99
Unemploy¬
ment Rate
3579.9
(.4349)
.001
(.461)
Unemploy
ment Rat
(-4)
11215.2
(2.075)
12282.8
(5.324)
.003
(2.369)
.004
(7.435)
DW
1.87
1.82
1.13
1.99
2.39
1.20
Ü) to 1986
e
2
-1
2
Unemploy¬
ment Rate
(-8)
-2896.9
(-.361)
9048.5
(1.193)
.001
(.377)
.007
(2.719)
h
.38
.48
.46
.03
.06
.40
(4)
Lagged
Dependent
Variable
.896
(8.370)
.857
(32.316)
.842
(8.298)
.807
(6.115)
.839
(30.590)
.656
(5.629)
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Chapter 6 Policies and Policy Recommendations
by Ρ Ν Junankar
6.1 Introduction
In this study we have discussed the growing problem of very long term
unemployment (VLTU) and various policies that have been introduced in
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K. In looking at policies towards
the VLTU we can consider the implications for equity and (economic)
efficiency. Most of the policies that have been introduced are with a bias
towards equity. However, it is very difficult to estimate the efficiency
costs: government policies to employ or train the VLTU at the expense of
the short term or medium term unemployed may involve a higher cost because
of the worse qualifications (productivity?) of the VLTU. But the continuation
of VLTU may also increase the burden on society in terms of increased
expenditure on health care: medicines, doctors, hospitals etc. It is generally
accepted that the problem of LTU and VLTU is so severe that we must be
willing to sacrifice some of the "efficiency costs". We shall argue in this
chapter that we need an integrated policy approach which expands aggregate
demand and targets various policies towards the VLTU. We may also wish to
target policies at people who are likely to become VLTU.
In some earlier work, Junankar (1986a,b) we argued that the cost of
unemployment (economic, budgetary, individual and social) were enormous.
These arguments will not be repeated here to justify our policy
recommendations.
6.2 Analysis of Policies
Before we turn to analysing policies to decrease VLTU let us
differentiate between "real" and "cosmetic" policies. It is easier to define
"cosmetic" policies, which we shall ignore in the remainder of this chapter.
By cosmetic policies we mean policies introduced by various Governments
simply to affect the administrative count of unemployment, LTU and VLTU.
Thus policies which simply redefine the old VLTU as "young pensioners"
clearly decrease the numbers in VLTU: but this is purely a cosmetic device.
Similarly, policies which are introduced to make it harder to claim benefits
(or register as unemployed) are not a serious attempt to solve the problem.
For example, in Britain there has been a tightening up of the "availability for
work" criterion which has affected the unemployment count.
It is important to note that the economy is an integrated whole with (on
a macroeconomic scale) an output market, a labour market and a money
market (and in the longer run, a capital goods-real investment-market).
Policies that affect the output or money markets have secondary effects on
the labour market. In a Keynesian paradigm, the problem of unemployment is
due to a lack of aggregate demand: there is unemployment because the
output market is constrained. In our view the major method of tackling
VLTU is by an increase in aggregate demand, which will then increase the
demand for labour and hence increase employment. However, because the
labour market operates in a way that leads to a hiring of the short run
unemployed first, it would take a continuing recovery to lead to a fall in
VLTU. To lead to an improvement in the VLTU more quickly would require
other policies targetted specifically at them.
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It is possible to treat the impact of policies on unemployment, LTU and
VLTU schematically in terms of the impact on
(a) Labour demand
(b) labour supply
and (c) the operation of the labour market.
Keynesian economists, as mentioned earlier, argue that we should
introduce policies to affect labour demand via expanding aggregate demand.
Neoclassical economists recommend policies to affect labour supply and the
operation of the labour market. (For analytical simplicity we are considering
only "pure" types).
Most policies introduced in the European Community can be covered by
the above classification. We shall not provide details of all the policies
introduced in the member countries since they are essentially variations on
those introduced in the four countries we have looked at in detail above, viz.
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the. United Kingdom. The most
"advanced" set of policies towards long term unemployment have been
introduced in Denmark, and we shall refer to them below. A summary of
various policies in the European Commission was provided in InforMISEP (No.
17, March 1987) which is included as an appendix to this Chapter.
(a) Labour Demand
Policies can be introduced to increase labour demand either by
increasing aggregate demand or by changing the "price" of labour (or the
labour costs, broadly defined to include wages, employer's national insurance
payments, etc).
(i) Aggregate Demand This can be increased by either monetary or
fiscal methods. Monetary methods would include lowering real interest rates
while fiscal methods would include tax cuts or increases in public
expenditure. One reason many Governments have not followed this path is
that they are worried about the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement and the
possibility of renewed bouts of inflation. It has been argued by the Centre
for Labour Economics at the London School of Economics* that the LTU (and
a fortiori the VLTU) have little or no influence on wage determination so that
an increase in aggregate demand targetted at LTU (or VLTU) should be
introduced. Others have argued that the acceleration in European inflation
was caused by commodity price inflation (especially oil) so that, again,
aggregate demand may be stimulated.
Most discussion about stimulating aggregate demand has been over the
question of whether tax cuts or public investment expansion is better. The
House of Commons Employment Committee (1986) argued that tax cuts would
cost more per unemployed person and would take longer to have any effect.
On the other hand public investment would have a lower cost and would be
quicker in its effects. Public expenditure via Special Employment Measures,
according to them, would be the least cost method of decreasing, especially,
long term unemployment. (The estimates they quote are £47,000 for income
tax cuts, £26,000 for public investment, £15,000 for public current
expenditure, and £2,650 for Special Employment Measures (all estimates to
remove one unemployed person from the count). Although there can be a
debate about
* See for example Jackman et al (1986)
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the precise estimates quoted, there would be a consensus amongst most
economists about the above ranking.
One way of conceptualising the effects on labour demand is to consider
the impacts on the flows into and out of unemployment. An overall stimulus
to the economy via tax cuts or expansion in public expenditure would
decrease the inflow into unemployment and increase the outflow from
unemployment. Eventually, LTU and VLTU would fall: in the first instance
the short term unemployed would be hired and the medium term would not
flow into LTU and into VLTU. The income tax cuts method would take longer
to have any impact on unemployment and on VLTU. However the public
expenditure expansion could be targetted to have a maximum impact on
VLTU. The targetting can be in terms of expansion of those kinds of
industry that hire unskilled workers and use labour intensive methods. Thus
it is argued that public expenditure in construction (house and road
building) would mop up some of the unemployed and some of the VLTU. The
public expenditure should also be targetted at those regions which have the
highest levels or rates of VLTU. Finally, the public expenditure can be
targetted by specifying that the public (or private) authorities must hire a
specified number (or proportion) of their labour force from among the VLTU.
Examples of this type of expansion are via Special Employment Measures like
the Community Programme in the U.K. and the TCT in Belgium. (The Belgian
TCT is almost unique in being targetted at the VLTU, most other measui'(.s
are usually aimed at the LTU). Voluntary Work Schemes are, to some extent,
similar.
The Danish Job Offer Scheme is an extremely enlightened one. Evory
insured person who has been unemployed for a cumulative period of 21
months out of 27 months (or 12 months out of 15 months for young people
less than 25 years of age) is guaranteed a temporary job for nine months in
the private sector or seven months in the public sector. The Government
pays a subsidy to the employer (private or public) but the local authorities
are responsible to provide employment for those who cannot find work ir. Ih«
private sector.
Schemes to provide unemployed people a grant to set up as self-employed
people (e.g. the European Allowance Scheme in the U.K.) unfortunately are
not appropriate for the VLTU who are least likely to be sufficiently motivated
or have the necessary funds to start an enterprise.
(ii) Labour costs There are various ways in which Governments alter
the 'price' of labour to the private or public sector. They can provide
marginal employment subsidies for any extra unemployed person hired. This
can be directed towards employing of VLTU as, for example, in Belgium.
Alternatively the Government can lower (say) the employer's national
insurance contributions for any new VLTU hired. However, studies of the
operation of these schemes suggest that these are not very effective because
of "deadweight" and "displacement" effects (see Chapter 5). Similarly, the
Government could subsidise early retirement of employed workers conditional
on hiring a LTU (or VLTU person) e.g. the British Job Release Scheme.
(b) Labour Supply
Many of the policies introduced by various Governments to affect the
quantity or quality of labour supply are to some extent "cosmetic" policies.
Thus, early retirement schemes of long term unemployed people, in say
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Belgium, France and the U.K., simply cover up the problem by re-definition.
Similarly, many training schemes may simply interrupt a spell of unemployment
and prevent the person from becoming LTU or VLTU. For example, if all
VLTU were required to join a training scheme then VLTU would disappear.
But if at the end of the training scheme all of them were still unemployed
they would be treated as newly unemployed people.
Of course, many training schemes do provide (useful) training and some
of the people do find work. These schemes vary in whether the training is
"on-the-job" or in special educational or quasi-educational centres. Again,
there is a variation in whether the subsidy is paid to the unemployed
individual or to the employer. Unfortunately, most of these training schemes
"cream off" the unemployed - those who are VLTU or likely to become VLTU
are unlikely to get onto these schemes. It is clear that in a changing
industrial environment there is need for training and retraining. These
schemes are likely to be successful in a buoyant labour market rather than
in a slack one.
An alternative method is to extend schooling. This, of course, decreases
labour supply and should therefore lower unemployment. But in some sense
this may also be a cosmetic measure: if we raised the school leaving age and
lowered the retiring age, unemployment (and hence VLTU) would certainly
fall. But it would be an enormously expensive method.
There have been attempts, say in the U.K., to encourage people to accept
low paid jobs by paying them a subsidy for a limited period of time. In
some countries unemployment benefit continues to be paid if the unemployed
accept part time low paid work. These methods are unlikely to have any-
significant impact on VLTU.
It is worth making the following point: if a helicopter went over all the
unemployed people in Europe and scattered PhDs or engineering qualifications
on all of them, unemployment is unlikely to fall. In a quantity constrained
labour market the "faces" of the employed and unemployed may change
without any net impact on the labour market.^
Again, a VLTU person loses motivation and searches less intensively for
work. Any policy to re-motivate the VLTU may help some individuals, but if
this simply involves someone else not finding work and becoming longer term
unemployed, all that may happen is a redistribution of unemployment.
(c) The Labour Market
Some neoclassical economists (and many Conservative politicians) believe
that the problem of unemployment and VLTU can be cured by improving the
functioning of the labour market. They argue that removing restrictions on
employers' freedom to hire and fire (e.g. employment protection legislation)
and removing the power of unions would make real wage rates more sensitive
to states of excess supply and demand, The current term for this is
"flexibility" in the labour market.
It is in this context that special employment measures like "Restart",
"Job Clubs", etc were introduced. By providing the unemployed with
* With apologies to Milton Friedman's experiment of scattering money from a
helicopter.
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information about the labour market in terms of vacancies, improving their
job search techniques, increasing mobility of labour (occupationally,
geographically etc), and altering their "expectations" (i.e. accepting low paid
jobs) would decrease VLTU.
Besides this view, it is possible to lower VLTU by changing the
operation of labour markets by persuading employers not to make older
people redundant (since they are likely to become VLTU), by encouraging
firms to provide alternative employment in their subsidiaries (or other plants)
to those people they plan to dismiss. The Goverment could provide a
"mobility allowance" to VLTU workers in high unemployment regions to enable
them to move and look for work in low unemployment regions. This mobility
allowance could be in two parts: one for job search purposes and another to
cover the (higher) costs of housing in the low unemployment region. This
mobility allowance could be paid for (say) upto twelve months.
Some of the policies we have discussed may have a short-run impact
while others may have a long-run impact. Some policies may simply
re-distribute unemployment and in some equity sense may still be preferable
to no policies. Targetted employment policies can be aimed at those currently
VLTU or those people who are likely to become VLTU (e.g. the old, the
handicapped, ethnic minorities).
6.3 Policy Recommendations
Our study leads to us to the following recommendations:
(i) A co-ordinated European Community expansion of public
sector expenditure in housing, health services and
education. This expansion to be concentrated in those
regions with the highest VLTU.
(ii) A Job guarantee scheme for all the Very Long Term Unemployed
(cf. the Danish Job Offer Scheme) .
(iii) Subsidies to employers who hire VLTU people.
(iv) A regional employment subsidy.
(v) A regional investment subsidy to firms that hire a certain
proportion of their labour force from the VLTU.
(vi) A mobility allowance to be paid to the VLTU for up to
12 months to move from high unemployment regions to low
unemployment regions. This payment to be made whether
or not the person has found employment.
(vii) Training schemes at the work-place with the employer and
trainee receiving an allowance.
In addition to these recommendations, we would propose the setting up
of an agency of the European Commission to gather information on labour
market flows and the setting up of a pilot longitudinal study of the
unemployed.
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These recommendations would need to be properly costed. Obviously, they
would involve an increase in public expenditure. However, we feel that there
is a crisis in the labour market and it requires crisis measures.
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